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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the late 2000s, a confluence of factors led to substantial changes in educator evaluation 
systems. Whereas evaluation systems under No Child Left Behind (NCLB) largely focused on 
school performance (Manna, 2011; Mehta, 2013), these new evaluation systems focused on the 
teacher (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2016). Research produced over the 2000s suggested this new 
focus was warranted because researchers found teachers had a substantial impact on student 
achievement (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004) and teacher effectiveness varied 
substantially within schools (Aaronson et al., 2007; Rivkin et al., 2005). At the same time, 
educators in the late 2000s reported teacher evaluation was not helping them improve (Weisberg, 
Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009). Soon after these findings became known, the federal Race 
to the Top competition incentivized state education agencies (SEA) to design new evaluation 
systems to improve teacher performance (US Department of Education, 2009).  
 Many changes to teacher evaluation fell into two broad categories: the introduction of 
student outcomes as a measure of teacher effectiveness, and introduction of standards-based 
observation protocols. The three most widely adopted means by which student achievement has 
been incorporated into teacher evaluations are value-added measures, student learning objectives, 
and student growth percentiles (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2016). In general, each of these three 
measures aims to differentiate teacher effectiveness based on student performance. This 
differentiation can inform personnel decision-making (e.g. retention) and teacher professional 
development plans. The second broad change to teacher evaluation systems concerned 
observations. While the practice of classroom observation had existed for decades (Brophy & 
Good, 1986), many classroom observation systems preceding the 2010s often used observation 
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rubrics that were not firmly grounded in research (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2016) and expected 
tenured teachers to be observed once every few years (Weisberg et al., 2009). Now, most modern 
teacher evaluation systems rely on standards-based observation protocols and expect most 
teachers to receive multiple observations per year (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2016). Conventional 
wisdom suggests these changes to teacher observation systems should improve teacher 
performance. That is, a higher frequency of observations using standards-based protocols should 
generate information educators can use to improve teacher performance.  
 While a great deal of recent research has investigated the effects of introducing student 
outcomes into teacher evaluation, the effects of observation-related changes have received less 
attention (Cohen & Goldhaber, 2016). Yet, there are at least three reasons to be concerned about 
these latter changes: burdens placed on administrators, costs of these new systems, and the 
importance of teachers to student outcomes. Recent research suggests new teacher evaluation 
systems demand more time from administrators (Kraft & Gilmour, 2016a; Neumerski et al., 
2014), and that administrators believe these systems are quite burdensome (Rigby, 2015). These 
findings are not surprising considering that many teachers used to be observed once every few 
years, but are now expected to receive approximately four observations per year (Steinberg & 
Donaldson, 2016). Second, new observation systems are the most expensive component of 
modern teacher evaluation systems (Stecher et al., 2016). One hopes this large budget item is 
money well-spent, but to make this determination we need to know more about the relationship 
between observations and teacher performance. Finally, research finds students taught by more 
effective teachers experience better short- and long-term outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, & 
Rockoff, 2014). Although conventional wisdom posits teachers receiving a higher frequency of 
observations should improve, little research has examined whether this occurs. 
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 I address the need to understand more about the effects of changes to observation systems 
by answering the following research question: what is the impact of more frequent observations 
on teacher performance? Some work has identified the effects of introducing modern observation 
systems on teacher performance (Steinberg & Sartain, 2015; Taylor & Tyler, 2012). In brief, this 
work suggests the adoption of modern observation systems (i.e. standards-based observation 
protocols) improves teacher performance. However, little, if any, research has examined whether 
undergoing more observations within these systems improves teacher performance. The 
administrative burdens and costs associated with more frequent observations may be worthwhile 
if observations appreciably improve teacher effectiveness. Alternatively, anything less than a 
positive relationship between observations and teacher performance would imply something 
about observation-related policies and/ or practices needs to change.  
Treating variation in the number of observations received per year as exogenous is 
problematic (e.g. observers may observe less effective teachers more because they want to 
closely monitor their teaching). To overcome this endogeneity problem, I exploit policy-imposed 
discontinuities in the assignment of classroom observations. Policy-assigned observations 
depend on a continuous, observable measure of teacher performance. I identify exogenous 
variation in the number of observations received per year using a regression discontinuity design. 
Since educators have no control over policy-assigned observations, observations brought about 
by policy inducement are plausibly exogenous. I apply this research design to multiple years of 
administrative data from Tennessee to answer my research question.  
To preview my findings, there is no evidence more observations improve teacher 
performance as measured by student growth scores. This holds true over teachers with varying 
levels of experience, at different grade levels, and who are evaluated by observers with greater or 
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lesser degrees of expertise. In Chapters 1and 2 I discuss the study context and review relevant 
research, respectively. Chapter 3 discusses methodology and data, and Chapter 4 threats to 
internal validity. Chapter 5 includes findings. In Chapter 6 I end with a discussion of study 
limitations and offer policy solutions that may improve the effectiveness of observations.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
STUDY CONTEXT 
 
Introduction 
In the early 2010s, the Tennessee Department of Education (TDOE) implemented 
sweeping changes to its teacher evaluation system. The primary goal of the new system, called 
the Tennessee Educator Acceleration Model (TEAM), is formative evaluation (Tennessee Board 
of Education, 2013). The secondary goal of TEAM concerns personnel decisions more broadly. 
Specifically, state policy urges educators to use TEAM evaluations when making decisions about 
hiring, tenure and dismissal, and compensation (Tennessee Board of Education, 2013).  
In broad terms, TEAM aims to reach its primary goal by providing educators with 
measures of teacher performance that can be used to support teacher professional development, 
broadly defined (Alexander, 2016). TEAM generates “qualitative and quantitative” measures of 
teacher performance (Alexander, 2016). The qualitative measure is a summative observation 
score generated by trained observers using standards-based observation protocols. After an 
observation, observers should provide teachers with feedback that the teacher, or the teacher and 
observer, can use to improve teacher performance. Quantitative measures are based on student 
outcomes and are not generated until after the end of a school year (e.g. graduation rates, 
achievement, and value-added scores).  
In what follows I briefly describe the calculation of growth and achievement scores 
because these scores partially determine a teacher’s level of effectiveness (LOE), the running 
variable in regression discontinuity designs (RDDs). I then discuss the design of the classroom 
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observation process. This chapter ends with a brief explanation of the assignment of 
observations, the predictor of interest. I return to this assignment process in Chapter 3 when 
discussing instruments used in fuzzy RDDs.  
 
Teacher Performance Measures Based on Student Outcomes 
Two of three1 TDOE measures of teacher effectiveness are based on student outcomes: 
the achievement and growth scores. The achievement measure is a measure of district- / school-
wide student outcomes including student achievement scores, and graduation or attendance rates, 
etc. Teacher growth scores are based on student academic outcomes, but growth score options 
depend on whether the teacher teaches a tested subject.  
A teacher and her school administrator2 choose an achievement measure at the beginning 
of each school year from a TDOE approved list of measures (Tennessee State Board of 
Education, 2013). Students in a teacher’s school or district generate scores produced by each of 
these measures. Achievement measures are based on aggregations of grade-, department-, 
school-, or district-wide student outcomes. Once an educator selects her achievement measure, 
teachers and their school administrator develop measurable performance criteria based on 
student outcomes produced by the achievement measure if such criteria do not exist. The teacher 
and her school administrator develop performance criteria aligned with the chosen achievement 
measure and map these criteria onto an integer scale of [1, 5]. For example, if a high school 
teacher and her school administrator select the graduation rate as the achievement measure, the 
performance criteria could assign percentage point changes in the graduation rate of (-100, -3), [-
                                               
1 Some Tennessee districts use a fourth LOE determinant: study perception surveys. I exclude these districts from the analysis because they use 
alternative observation systems (i.e. non-TEAM observation systems).  
 
2 Not all school administrators serve as teacher evaluators, nor are all teacher evaluators school administrators. Nevertheless, more than 85% of 
teacher evaluators are principals or assistant principals (i.e. school administrators).  
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3, -1), [-1, 1), [1, 3), (3, 100] to levels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. (Tennessee Board of 
Education, 2013) 
In principle, each teacher could develop her own achievement criteria, but in practice this 
does not happen. New performance criteria need approval from TDOE. Teachers and school 
administrators tend to avoid this approval process by using previously approved criteria. 
Teachers in the same school/ grade/ subject who choose the same school-/ grade-/ subject-level 
achievement measure tend to use the same achievement criteria.  
The second quantitative TDOE measure of teacher effectiveness is the growth score. All 
teachers receive a growth score, however, the source of the score depends on whether the teacher 
teaches a tested subject. The Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) estimates 
the impact of tested teachers on their students’ test scores relative to the impact of the 
hypothetical average teacher on her students’ test scores (SAS, 2016). The Tennessee suite of 
statewide accountability exams (e.g. End of Course exams, Tennessee Comprehensive 
Achievement Program) produces scores used by TVAAS.  
A TVAAS score is converted into a TVAAS index by dividing a teacher’s value-added 
estimate (i.e. TVAAS score) by the associated standard error (SAS, 2015). Thus, teachers with 
the same TVAAS score may have different TVAAS indices if their standard errors differ. The 
TVAAS index is continuous and ranges between -24 and 39 in the population of Tennessee 
teachers during the study period (2012-13 through 2014-15). These continuous scores are 
transformed into integer values in the range [1, 5] before use in the LOE calculation3.  
                                               
3 Continuous growth indices in the ranges (-µ, -2), [-2, -1), [-1, 1), [1, 2), and [2, µ) are respectively assigned integers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 (SAS, 
2015). 
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TVAAS scores/ indices/ levels are only estimated for teachers of tested subjects, who 
represented less than 50% of all Tennessee teachers during the study period. TVAAS does not 
furnish a growth score for other Tennessee teachers4. The majority (80%) of the latter are 
assigned growth scores based on school-wide value-added scores. As the name implies, school 
level value-added scores are based on scores generated by students at a teacher’s school5. The 
growth scores of all teachers are transformed into an integer in the interval [1, 5].  
 
Teacher Performance Measures Based on Observational Ratings 
Teacher LOE is determined by quantitative and qualitative measures. Qualitative 
measures are determined by the observation system. The Tennessee Board of Education (TBOE) 
and TDOE have issued multiple directives concerning classroom observations conducted as part 
of TEAM. For example, classroom observers must meet re/ certification expectations, prior 
performance determines the minimum number of observations teachers should receive, and 
teachers should always receive timely, post-observation feedback. In this section I describe key 
design elements of the TEAM classroom observation system.  
There are multiple types of observations. Observations can be walkthroughs or non-
walkthroughs. Both refer to a classroom visit by a TDOE-certified observer and either may 
generate post-observation feedback. However, a walkthrough should not result in any 
observation scores while non-walkthroughs must result in scores used for TEAM purposes. An 
observation is also unannounced or announced. The key difference between announced and 
                                               
4 During the study period local education agencies (LEA) assigned teachers of untested subjects one of three growth scores: (1) student portfolio 
scores for teachers of the Fine Arts, World Languages, and Physical Education, (2) K-2 student assessment scores for 1st and 2nd grade teachers, 
or (3) school-wide value-added scores for all non-tested teachers (Tennessee State Board of Education, 2013). Growth scores based on student 
portfolios or K-2 assessments are based on assessments of the teacher’s content area. 
 
5 School level value-added scores are not typically based on assessments of the content taught by teachers of untested subjects. For example, no 
music assessment results are used in the estimation of school-wide value-added, although music teachers in some LEAs may be assigned the 
school-wide value-added score. 
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unannounced observations is that teachers know about the former observation in advance. TBOE 
policy states at least half of a teacher’s observations must be unannounced (Tennessee Board of 
Education, 2013). Finally, observers can rate teachers with respect to one or two “domains” on 
the TEAM rubric during a single observation (I discuss domains in the following section).  
For purposes of this dissertation, an observation refers to an announced or unannounced, 
non-walkthrough, single classroom visit conducted for the TEAM observation system. This 
operationalization means there is a one-to-one6 correspondence between an observation, post-
observation feedback session, and “observation cycle.” An observation cycle includes a pre-
observation conference if appropriate (see below), classroom visit that may result in multiple 
scored domains, a post-observation feedback session, and the in/ formal design and/ or 
refinement of a teacher improvement plan. TDOE expects observers to submit a single area for 
professional improvement after each classroom visit, no matter how many domains scored. Thus, 
according to my operationalization, the number of observations received by a teacher is the same 
as the number of post-observation feedback and improvement plan sessions received. For this 
reason, I use the terms “observations”, “classroom visits”, and “observation cycles” 
interchangeably.  
 
                                               
6 Observations could have been defined as the number of domains rated per year. For example, if an observer generated scores for two domains 
during a single classroom visit this could count as two observations instead of one. My definition of an observation represents a one-to-one-to-
one-to-one relationship among classroom visits, observations, post-observation feedback sessions, and subsequent teacher performance 
improvement plans. The domain-based definition would represent a one-to-many-to-one-to-one relationship. This clouds the definition of 
treatment. Additionally, the domain-based definition should produce attenuated treatment effects. Notwithstanding these two points, I estimate 
the effects of domain-based observations in subsequently described RDDs. First-stage instruments are strong joint predictors of both versions of 
observations (all F-test p values < 0.001). Furthermore, all treatment effects behave as expected: estimates based on the number of domain-based 
observations received are attenuated relative to my definition. 
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Observation Rubrics: Characteristics and Scoring 
Observations must be conducted using a TDOE approved rubric measuring at least three7 
domains: Instruction, Environment, and Planning  (Tennessee Board of Education, 2013). While 
local education agencies (LEAs) could use their own rubrics, over 80% used the state-adopted 
TEAM rubric (see Appendix B) and accompanying TEAM observation system during the study 
period (Tennessee Department of Education, 2016). This dissertation focuses only on classroom 
observations in the TEAM observation system, given its widespread adoption and clear policies 
regarding the frequency of observations. TDOE and the National Institute for Excellence in 
Teaching co-developed the TEAM rubric, which is based on Charlotte Danielson’s Framework 
for Teaching (Alexander, 2016). The Instruction domain includes twelve indicators, the most of 
any domain (see Appendix B). Some Instruction indicators are content neutral (e.g. Motivating 
Students, Grouping Students), but many indicators measure arguably content-specific teacher or 
teacher-student interactions (e.g. Academic Feedback, Presenting Instructional Content, 
Questioning). The second domain is the Environment domain, consisting of four indicators: 
Expectations, Managing Student Behavior, Environment, and Respectful Culture. The third 
domain is Planning, which includes the fewest indicators: Instructional Plans, Student Work, and 
Assessment. If the observation is announced, observers can judge a teacher with respect to the 
Planning domain during the pre-conference. Thus, only behaviors occurring during a lesson 
should inform the scoring of Instruction and Environment domains (see Appendix B).  
Within the confines of TEAM observation policy, observers assign integer scores of [1, 
5] with respect to each indicator. “Significantly Above Expectations” refers to exemplary 
                                               
7 TDOE expects observation rubrics to include a fourth domain, the Professionalism domain, but this domain is not scored during classroom 
visits. Observers use the Professionalism domain to judge the extent to which a teacher engages in extra-instructional practices such as data use 
and professional growth (see Appendix B for a copy of the TEAM rubric).  
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teacher/ student behaviors with respect to each indicator. These behaviors receive a score of five. 
“Significantly Below Expectations” refers to undesirable behaviors and receive a score of one. 
An observer could also generate a rating of three, indicating the behavior was “At Expectations” 
(see Appendix B). TDOE expects observers to generate Instruction, Environment, and Planning 
scores based on the preponderance of evidence observed. If the observed evidence does not place 
a teacher squarely into one of the three levels of performance, an observer can assign a rating of 
two (four) for a preponderance of behaviors straddling the lowest and middle (and highest) 
categories. (Alexander, 2016) 
 
Observer Certification 
Classroom observations should only be conducted by TDOE certified observers 
(Tennessee Board of Education, 2013). First-time observers must attend an initial TEAM 
training in which they hone the accuracy of their observation scores and learn about the TEAM 
teacher evaluation system. Attendees also receive some annual training (less than six hours) 
regarding pre- and post-observation conferences. Below, I describe these conferences in detail. 
Following this initial training, all prospective observers must demonstrate mastery regarding 
their knowledge of the teacher evaluation system and accurate rating of teacher/ student 
behaviors by taking an online certification exam administered by the National Institute for 
Excellence in Teaching. (Alexander, 2016) 
 
Pre- and Post-Observation Conferences 
Teachers should participate in post-observation conferences (a conference held after each 
observation) to discuss teacher strengths, weaknesses, and plans for improvement (Tennessee 
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Board of Education, 2013). Observers should also initiate a pre-observation conference when the 
observation is announced (Alexander, 2016). The purpose of the pre-conference is for the 
observer to learn more about the upcoming lesson. Observers may take this opportunity to score 
a teacher/ lesson with respect to the Planning domain and/ or provide suggestive formative 
feedback to the teacher in order to improve lesson outcomes (Alexander, 2016). Observers and 
teachers are expected to engage in a post-observation conference within one week of an 
announced or unannounced TEAM observation (Alexander, 2016; Tennessee Board of 
Education, 2013). Observers should collect their observational notes and ratings and be prepared 
to share their feedback with the teacher during the post-observation conference (Tennessee 
Board of Education, 2013).  
TDOE expects observers to share more than observation scores with a teacher during the 
post-observation conference. During the post-observation conference the teacher and observer 
should draw on observation scores and notes to identify a teacher’s area of greatest strength and 
weakness (Alexander, 2016). Specifically, the teacher and observer should select one indicator 
(e.g. one of the twelve Instruction indicators) as the teacher’s area of greatest strength and one 
indicator as a teacher’s greatest weakness after each classroom visit. During the post-observation 
conference the observer and teacher should develop a set of actionable next steps to develop the 
teacher’s practice with respect to their area of weakness (Alexander, 2016). Observers should 
enter brief notes about a teacher’s greatest strength and weakness into the TDOE administrative 
data system. In subsequent observations, observers should monitor a teacher’s area of weakness 
to support instructional improvement.  
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Determination of Summative Observational Ratings 
TEAM summative observational scores are the mean indicator score across all ratings 
received within a school year. TEAM scores (“summative TEAM scores” and “TEAM scores/ 
ratings” used interchangeably) are approximately continuous and range from [1, 5].  
 
Teacher Level of Effectiveness (LOE) 
LOE is a composite measure of teacher effectiveness. Different factors scale each of the 
three LOE determinants. Throughout the study period (2012-13 through 2014-15) achievement 
scores were scaled by a factor of 15. In 2012-13 the growth scores (i.e. growth scores measured 
in 2011-12) of all teachers were scaled by 35, but this factor was lowered to 25 for teachers of 
untested subjects beginning in the 2012-13 year (i.e. this changed first affected growth scores in 
2013-14). Finally, the TEAM score of all teachers was scaled by a factor of 50 in 2012-13 school 
year, but beginning in the 2012-13 school year the summative observation score for teachers of 
untested subjects was scaled by a factor of 60. The sum of these three scale scores produces a 
variable I will call LOE-cont, an approximately continuous measure ranging from 100 to 500 
(Tennessee State Board of Education, 2013).  
TDOE uses LOE-cont to assign teachers to one of five discrete LOE categories (LOE). 
Teachers whose LOE-cont is within [100, 200), [200, 275), [275,350), [350, 425), or [425, 500] 
are respectively assigned LOE scores of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 (Tennessee Department of Education, 
n.d.-b).  
There are two exceptions to the rule assigning LOE-cont to LOE. If a teacher’s TVAAS 
level is three or greater, and greater than her achievement score, she can use the TVAAS level in 
lieu of the achievement score. This substitution is made at the discretion of the LEA. Secondly, 
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an LEA can opt into a rule where a TVAAS level of four or greater can override an LOE of three 
or lower. (Tennessee Department of Education, 2015) 
 
Assignment of Observations 
In this chapter I briefly explain the assignment of observations. I return to this discussion 
in Chapter 3 when discussing the predictor of interest and instrument used in regression 
discontinuity designs. There are three broad factors affecting the number of observations 
teachers receive each year: certification status, lagged LOE, and educator discretion. Broadly, 
“certification status” identifies whether a teacher has taught for less than four years or more than 
three years. For most teachers, TBOE assigns teachers with a lagged LOE1 four classroom visits 
and LOE5 one classroom visit. TBOE policy assigns teachers with LOE2 – LOE4 four or two 
classroom visits depending on their certification status. TBOE assigns a minimum number of 
observations, but districts/ schools/ teachers can add to these minima. 
 
Expected Observation Practices 
 TBOE policy also describes expected observation practices with regard to the time spent 
on an observation, frequency of rating domains, combinations of domains observed during a 
single observation, and the number of domains scored during a semester. First, no matter how 
many observations a teacher receives per year, TBOE policy generally expects each observation 
(i.e. the classroom visit) to take approximately 15 minutes (Tennessee Board of Education, 
2013). The remaining three expectations depend on the minimum number of observations 
assigned to a teacher.  
  
 
15 
The minimum number of policy-assigned observations assigned to a teacher affects how 
often an observer should rate a lesson with respect to the Instruction, Environment, and Planning 
domains. TDOE expects observers to rate LOE1 teachers at least three, two, and two times 
relative to the Instruction, Environment, and Planning domains, respectively. Teachers observed 
at least twice should be observed at least two, one, and one times with respect to the Instruction, 
Environment, and Planning domains, respectively. Teachers receiving a single observation 
should be scored on each of these three domains during that visit. Teachers are also scored with 
respect to a Professionalism rubric, but this part of their evaluation does not involve a classroom 
visit or post-observation conference. (Tennessee Board of Education, 2013) 
Finally, there are expectations regarding the number of domains observed per semester. 
Teachers assigned a minimum of four observations must be observed with respect to all three 
domains each semester, while teachers assigned a minimum of two observations should be 
observed relative to at least two domains per semester. Teachers assigned a minimum of one 
observation are observed relative to all three domains in the first semester. (Tennessee Board of 
Education, 2013) 
 
Summary 
 The TEAM teacher evaluation system aims to provide educators with information that 
will improve teacher performance. Classroom observations and subsequent post-observation 
feedback are the linchpins to teacher improvement within the Tennessee teacher evaluation 
system. The TEAM observation system is designed to improve teacher performance via frequent 
classroom observations conducted by TDOE certified observers and timely post-observation 
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feedback. Most importantly, a TEAM observation and post-observation conference should result 
in clear, actionable next steps for educators to follow on the path towards improvement.  
 In the next chapter, I discuss relevant literature with respect to the following:  reasons 
why observations should improve teacher performance, challenges to the implementation of 
evaluation systems, and potential heterogeneity in the effects of observations on teacher 
performance.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DISCUSSION OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Introduction  
This discussion of related literature first describes the theory of action undergirding 
modern teacher evaluation systems. This theory of action formalizes the conventional wisdom 
that more observations per year should improve teacher performance. I then discuss some 
characteristics of modern teacher evaluation systems that could inhibit the effectiveness of 
observations as a tool for improving teacher performance. I return to some of these inhibitors 
when discussing implications in the last chapter. The final section frames the examination of 
heterogeneous effects described in later chapters.  
 
Modern Teacher Observation Systems: A Theory of Action 
 One distinguishing feature of modern teacher observation systems is the adoption of 
standards-based protocols (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2016). Theoretically, the adoption of these 
protocols (i.e. observation rubrics) should lead to higher student achievement because these 
rubrics describe teacher/ student behaviors prior work has linked to student learning. Observers 
should rate lessons/ teachers with respect to behaviors described in these rubrics, then share 
feedback with teachers. The provision of this feedback should highlight why the teacher did not 
exhibit exemplary behavior and provide information the teacher, or teacher and observer, can use 
to move teacher/ student behaviors towards those behaviors linked with higher student 
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achievement. If these things happen, more frequent observations should improve teacher 
performance as measured by student achievement scores. 
 It seems the TEAM teacher observation system was built with this theory of action in 
mind. Prior work has linked the teacher/ student behaviors described in the TEAM rubric to 
higher student achievement scores (Daley & Kim, 2010; Danielson Group, n.d.). TEAM 
observers should provide teachers with feedback during post-observation conferences so the 
teacher, or teacher and observer, can use the feedback to improve. Moreover, TDOE expects 
more frequent observations to improve subsequent observation scores, student achievement, and 
TVAAS (i.e. student growth) (Alexander, 2016; Tennessee Department of Education, 2016). 
While it is possible classroom observations can generate information used exclusively for 
personnel decisions (e.g. retention), TBOE emphasizes the use of observations as a teacher 
performance improvement tool (Tennessee Board of Education, 2013).  
   
Widespread Challenges to the Effectiveness of Classroom Observations 
Despite the use of observations as a tool to improve teacher performance, there are at 
least four widespread challenges to the effectiveness of classroom observations as a formative 
evaluation tool (i.e. tool to improve teacher performance). I consider a challenge “widespread” if 
it is likely to affect the typical observer and/ or teacher. Two of these challenges are systemic. 
Observers, the majority of whom are school administrators, do not have enough time to 
effectively manage the teacher evaluation process (Kraft & Gilmour, 2016a), and it is 
challenging for educators to match teachers needing formal professional development to 
appropriate professional learning opportunities (Curtis & Wiener, 2012; Weisberg et al., 2009). 
The other two challenges concern observer expertise: prior work suggests the typical classroom 
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observer lacks expertise in the facilitation of post-observation conferences and in the teacher’s 
content area (Kraft & Gilmour, 2016a).  
Modern teacher evaluation systems require substantially more time to manage than 
previous systems, which could make it difficult for school administrators to provide effective 
formative evaluation. In the early 2010s, teacher evaluation systems underwent substantial 
changes, including increasing the frequency of observations (Georgia Department of Education, 
2012; Kraft & Gilmour, 2016b; Tennessee Board of Education, 2013). This change alone would 
increase the time school administrators spend on observations, ceteris paribus. Prior work also 
implies principals responded to these time demands by engaging in satisficing behaviors, such as 
conducting brief observations (Halverson, Kelley, & Kimball, 2004; Sartain et al., 2011) and 
brief post-observation conferences (Kimball, 2003; Kraft & Gilmour, 2016a). Either of these 
satisficing behaviors could impede the success of observations as formative evaluation tools.  
The second widespread challenge concerns teacher professional learning opportunities, 
an ostensibly integral component of formative evaluation for some teachers. Some teachers may 
not need anything more than feedback to improve, but others may require subsequent 
professional development. Practitioners note teacher evaluation systems do a poor job matching 
teachers needing professional development with appropriate professional learning opportunities 
(Curtis & Wiener, 2012; Weisberg et al., 2009). This poor matching would likely inhibit the 
effectiveness of observations for some teachers. Moreover, research suggests teachers are less 
likely to act on post-observation feedback if they do not believe they can access appropriate 
professional learning opportunities in response to this feedback (Cherasaro, Brodersen, Reale, & 
Yanoski, 2016). At least two state educational agencies have recognized this problem within 
modern evaluation systems and have attempted to address it by supporting flexible, context-
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specific, and ongoing school-based forms of professional development (Georgia Department of 
Education, 2012; Tennessee Department of Education, 2018).  
The other two widespread challenges concern observer characteristics. Since the typical 
classroom observer is a school administrator (Kraft & Gilmour, 2016a), these two challenges 
amount to challenges concerning school administrator characteristics. For decades, research 
outside education has suggested observer expertise regarding an employee’s core work is 
positively related to improvements in employee performance (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). 
Observers with expertise in the employee’s work are better equipped to provide reliable 
observation scores and more useful feedback (Ilgen et al., 1979; Levy & Williams, 2004). The 
provision of such scores and feedback is ostensibly important to formative evaluation. Research 
suggests employees are more likely to dismiss observation scores and post-observation feedback 
if they believe scores are inaccurate and feedback is not useful (Cherasaro et al., 2016; Jawahar, 
2010). Education researchers have also found that classroom observers with expertise in the 
content area of the teachers they observe are better able to support teacher improvement (Hill & 
Grossman, 2013). Some research reports even principals believe their lack of content expertise 
makes it difficult for some teachers to accept their feedback (Kraft & Gilmour, 2016a). It is 
practically impossible for the typical observer/ school administrator to possess content expertise 
relative to all the classrooms she observes. In conjunction with research concerning the 
importance of observer expertise, the limited expertise of the typical classroom observer 
challenges the successful formative evaluation of teachers.  
Ineffective facilitation of post-observation conferences is the fourth widespread challenge 
to the effectiveness of classroom observations. A meta-analysis by Kluger and DeNisi  
concerning the relationship between provision of post-observation feedback and employee 
  
 
21 
performance found mixed results (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). While prior work and conventional 
wisdom suggest post-observation feedback should improve employee performance, the Kluger 
and DeNisi meta-analysis found there were circumstances under which feedback worsened 
employee performance (1996). Specifically, there was a negative relationship between the 
provision of post-observation feedback and employee performance when the feedback was 
mostly positive and the employee’s core work was complex (negative feedback identifies an 
employee’s area of weakness). Teaching is arguably complex and recent research finds 
principals report being uncomfortable providing teachers with negative feedback (Kraft & 
Gilmour, 2016a).  
Although new observation systems include standards-based protocols, more frequent 
observations, and post-observation conferences (Alexander, 2016; Tennessee Department of 
Education, 2016), there are widespread challenges to the effectiveness of observations as a tool 
to improve teacher performance. Despite these widespread challenges research also suggests 
more observations can benefit some teacher subgroups more than others (i.e. heterogeneous 
effects exist).  
 
Heterogeneity in the Effectiveness of Observations 
 In this section I discuss some teacher and school characteristics research suggests 
moderates the effectiveness of observations as a formative evaluation tool. It is important to 
discuss and examine heterogeneous treatment effects for at least two reasons. First, 
heterogeneous effects would imply SEAs/ policymakers could strategically reallocate the number 
of observations conducted by observers across teacher subgroups. Subgroups benefitting from 
observations could receive relatively more observations. Second, SEAs could target supports for 
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observers working with subgroups of teachers for whom observations are not relatively 
beneficial.  
Prior work implies the relationship between the provision of post-observation feedback 
and changes in teacher performance depends in part on the presence of enabling work conditions. 
Specifically, researchers outside education find workplaces in which employees report receiving 
higher quality feedback or believe evaluation systems are formative have stronger, positive 
relationships between observations and employee performance (London & Smither, 2002). 
Similarly, teachers working in schools where colleagues approve of the implementation of the 
evaluation system report they are more likely to use information generated by the evaluation 
system to improve performance (Sun, Mutcheson, & Kim, 2016). 
 Prior research also suggests grade levels are a potential moderator of the relationship 
between observations and teacher performance. In the previous section, I discussed the 
importance of observer expertise. In the early 2000s, Kimball found high school teachers were 
especially likely to dismiss feedback generated by an observer without content expertise 
(Kimball, 2003). Perhaps high school teachers believe there is a wider gap between their content 
knowledge and the knowledge of the typical observer. Regardless, Kimball’s work implies 
observations may be a more effective tool for formative evaluation in earlier grade levels. 
 The last potential moderator is a teacher level moderator: years of experience. Relative to 
mid- and late-career teachers, new teachers report they are more likely to perceive feedback 
provided by their observer as credible (Kimball, 2003). Psychological research confirms the 
conventional wisdom that if an employee does not perceive feedback as credible, she is less 
likely to productively respond to the feedback (Ilgen et al., 1979; Jawahar, 2010).  
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Summary 
 While evaluation/ observation systems can inform personnel decision-making and 
formative evaluation, it seems modern teacher observation systems focus on the latter. More 
importantly, the TEAM theory of action implies more frequent observations should improve 
measures of student achievement. However, there are widespread challenges that may inhibit the 
effectiveness of observations as a formative evaluation tool. At the same time, prior work 
suggest observations may be especially beneficial for certain teacher subgroups, which could 
allow teachers in these subgroups to overcome these widespread challenges.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss observation cycles in greater detail, and methods and data used to 
answer my research question. In brief, I draw on Tennessee Department of Education 
administrative data from 2012-13 through 2014-15 and use a 2SLS local regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) to generate my main findings.  
The main findings concern the relationship between the number of observations received 
per year (sometimes referred to as “frequency of observations”) and contemporaneous teacher 
performance. I also estimate longer-term and heterogeneous effects. It is plausible it takes time 
for observations to affect teacher performance, while prior research suggests teachers may 
respond to observations in different ways. The outcomes of interest are teacher level mean 
student achievement scores in math and reading/ language arts (RLA) and teacher value-added 
scores (TVAAS). As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the TEAM theory of action asserts educators 
will use feedback based on the standards-based TEAM observation rubric to move teacher/ 
student behaviors towards rubric-defined exemplary behaviors. Prior work has linked these 
exemplary behaviors to higher student achievement. Thus, more frequent observations should 
improve student achievement scores. I use teacher level mean (TLM) student achievement as the 
outcome of interest when identifying the effect of observations on student achievement. Since 
additional observations are expected to raise student achievement, more observations should also 
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affect value-added measures. I explore this by identifying the effect of more frequent 
observations on TVAAS scores.  
One might expect that undergoing more observations would also increase scores teachers 
receive when observed again in the future. I do not discuss this relationship any further because 
there is strong evidence observers score teachers differently as a function of the number of 
observations they have been assigned. This becomes confounded with the causal impact of 
observations on teacher performance when observation scores are employed as an outcome of 
interest. Appendix C documents the existence of observer bias and explores some possible 
explanations. 
In the remainder of this chapter I discuss the assignment of observations, models, and 
data characteristics. 
 
Policy Assignment of Observations 
According to state policy, two variables determine the minimum number of observations 
a teacher is supposed to undergo in a given year: prior-year LOE and teacher certification 
status—i.e., whether a teacher holds Apprentice or Professional certification8. The primary 
difference between Apprentice and Professional teachers is years of experience: the former has 
                                               
8 All teachers new to Tennessee traditional public schools receive an initial certification lasting three years. Certifications permit teachers to work 
in the Tennessee public education system as classroom teachers. TDOE should revoke the license of an Apprentice if she does not successfully 
complete an approved educator preparation program during her initial three years. Teachers who complete an educator program but do not 
advance to a Professional certification at the end of the initial three-year period retain their Apprentice certification status. If an Apprentice does 
not advance to Professional status by the end of the second three-year cycle her certification is non-renewed. Tested and non-tested teachers may 
advance from Apprentice to Professional status if they have not received a LOE1 (TVAAS1 for tested teachers) during any of the three years 
prior to their advancement request. Unlike an Apprentice certification, a Professional certification lasts six years. TDOE renews a Professional 
certification if a teacher has not received an LOE1 (or TVAAS1 for tested teachers) in any of the three years preceding her renewal request, 
otherwise the Professional teacher becomes an Apprentice. Classroom teachers with a Professional certification who do not meet performance 
expectations (i.e. assigned to LOE1 or tested teachers assigned to TVAAS1) should be placed on a one year “review status” during which they 
are evaluated as though they are a first-year educator. If a Professional teacher on review status does not receive LOE1 (or TVAAS1 for tested 
teachers) at the end of their review status year, she retains her Professional status, otherwise the certification is non-renewed. Policy assigns tested 
Apprentice LOE2 – LOE4 (i.e. LOE-cont [200, 425)) teachers a minimum of four observations per year, and tested Professional teachers assigned 
to LOE2 – LOE4 a minimum of two observations. (Tennessee State Board of Education, 2013a) 
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less than four, the latter four or more. State policy requires LOE5 (i.e. LOE-cont > 425) teachers 
undergo a minimum of one observation and LOE1 (i.e. LOE-cont < 200) a minimum of four. 
Rules governing the minimum number of observations for LOE2 – LOE4 (i.e. LOE-cont > 200 
and LOE < 425) depend on certification status. Policy assigns an LOE2 – LOE4 Apprentice 
(Professional) teacher a minimum of four (two) observations. Districts or schools may adopt 
policies adding to these state-assigned minima. (Tennessee Department of Education, n.d.-b)9 
 
Educator Compliance with TBOE Assignment of Observations 
Table 1 displays the distribution of observations received by the population of teachers 
with different certification-LOE combinations. Percentages represent the percentage of teachers 
with a certain certification and LOE (e.g. 72.54% of Apprentice teachers with a LOE1 received 
four classroom visits) receiving some number of observations. The percentages within each box 
total to 100. Bold cells indicate the minimum number of state-prescribed classroom visits a 
teacher should receive.  
Table 1 shows there is acceptable and unacceptable non-compliance from the standpoint 
of state policy. Educators can add to the state minimum number of observations, but teachers 
should never receive less than the minima. The largest degree of unacceptable non-compliance 
exists for Apprentice teachers with an LOE2 – LOE4: almost 25% of these teachers receive less 
than the expected four classroom visits. Roughly 10% (14%) of Professional (Apprentice) 
teachers with an LOE1 receive less than the assigned four observations. Unexpectedly, a sizeable 
                                               
9 As noted in Chapter 2, some teachers of tested subjects may have their LOE determined entirely by their TVAAS scores and not by LOE-cont.  
For most of the analyses that follow, the estimation sample drops such teachers.  Even when they are retained, LOE-cont remains strongly 
predictive of the number of observations a teacher undergoes. 
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minority of teachers with an LOE5 receive more than the state prescribed minimum of one 
observation: approximately 20% of these teachers receive two observations. 
There are at least three reasons why teachers may not receive the policy-assigned number 
of observations. First, there is some ambiguity regarding what is to count as an observation. 
Some administrators may define an observation in terms of domains rated. For example, if an 
observer rates a teacher with respect to the Instruction and Environment domains during a single 
classroom visit, some interpret this as two “observations.” Second, districts/ schools may choose 
to evaluate some teachers more frequently than is required. Third, school administrators may 
deviate from state-assigned minima for reasons of their own.  
Non-compliance regarding the number of observations received is plausibly endogenous. 
There are several potential sources of endogeneity. Teacher motivation is plausibly related to 
teacher performance and the number of observations received (i.e. treatment). School 
administrators may observe less motivated teachers more often to closely monitor teacher 
behaviors, negatively biasing estimated effects. Alternatively, school administrators may observe 
more motivated teachers more often because these teachers are receptive to feedback, easing the 
observation process for administrators. Yet, the performance of these teachers will likely 
improve independent of observations received, introducing positive bias. Unobserved school 
administrator effectiveness is another potential source of bias. Effective school administrators 
likely improve teacher performance independent of treatment (e.g. positive work climate, 
adopting academic programs positively influencing student growth). It is plausible these 
administrators can improve teacher performance via observations using less than the policy-
assigned number of observations, positively biasing estimates. In a final example, endogeneity 
may also exist because of student behaviors/ characteristics. One year a teacher may be assigned 
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a group of students whose poor behavior affects teacher performance. School administrators may 
observe this teacher more often to help her devise strategies to mitigate poor student behavior, 
negatively biasing estimates.  
   
Methodology 
To identify the relationships of interest I employ 2SLS local RDDs. I use plausibly 
exogenous, local variation in lagged LOE-cont on either side of the 200 (425) threshold as an 
instrument to predict the number of observations received in year t. There are four instruments: 
whether an Apprentice teacher lies to the left or right of the 200 threshold; whether an 
Apprentice teacher lies to the left or right of the 425 threshold; and two analogous instruments 
for Professional teachers.  
I use the following model when the outcome is TVAAS:  (1)			%&'( = *+ + -./01 &'( + 23(·) + 56&'( + 78'( + 9( + :&'(, <=>?&'(< ≤ A (2)	./0&'( = *+̈ + DE(·) + 2̈3(·) + 5̈6&'( + 7̈8'( + 9( + F&'(, <=>?&'(< ≤ A 
where %&'(  represents the TVAAS score of teacher i in school j in year t. ./0&'( is the number of 
observations received in year t, and ./01 &(  the predicted number of observations from the first 
stage equation. f is a second order polynomial of the running variable interacted with teacher 
certification status (i.e. Professional/ Apprentice), and g the vector of four instruments. 6&'( is a 
vector of covariates including teacher race/ ethnicity, certification status, gender, years of 
teaching experience, certification status, and level of education. 8'(  is a vector of school level 
measures controlling for the distribution of teacher effectiveness in school j in year t, including 
the mean, standard deviation, and skewness of LOE-cont. 9( is a year fixed effect, and :&'( and 
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F&'( are idiosyncratic error terms. A 2SLS estimator produces estimates for cases where |=>?&'(| 
is less than or equal to bandwidth w. I include teacher- and school level controls because they 
may have an independent influence on the outcomes of interest and should increase the precision 
of estimates. The local average treatment effect (LATE) of interest, d, represents the effect of an 
additional observation per year on TVAAS scores10. Year fixed effects account for secular trends 
in observational practices.  
To estimate the relationship between observations and changes in student achievement I 
use grade-subject standardized math and reading/ language arts (RLA) scores from students in 
grades 4 – 12. These models differ from equations 1 and 2 in three ways. First, these two 
outcomes are the teacher level mean (TLM) math or RLA achievement scores for students taught 
by teacher i in year t. Second, I add a fourth order polynomial of the average lagged score11 of 
the same group of students as a control. Stated differently, the lagged polynomial is composed of 
the mean achievement score measured in year t – 1 that is associated with the group of students 
taught by teacher i in year t. Third, I add more controls to the vector 6&'(. This vector now 
includes the proportion of students taught by: race/ ethnicity, free/ reduced price lunch status, 
ESL status, gender, and immigrant status. All other controls and model specifications in 
equations 1 and 2 remain unchanged. I add the new controls because they increase the precision 
of d and may have an independent influence12 on TLM math or RLA achievement scores.  
                                               
10 LATEs produced by RDDs assume linearity. For example, the LATE of going from two the three observations is the same as going from four 
to five. However, the effect of an additional observation may be non-linear (i.e. depend on number of observations received). I return to this point 
after discussing my main findings. 
11 If a student taught by teacher i in year t did not have an achievement score in year t – 1, the student was not included in the analysis.  
12 TVAAS scores use multiple years of prior achievement data, but do not include student or contextual controls (SAS, 2015). Theoretically, these 
controls are not needed to estimate unbiased teacher effects given the use of multiple years of prior achievement data, however, prior empirical 
work finds TVAAS estimate are sensitive to the inclusion of these controls in some circumstances (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, & Hamilton, 
2003). There are at least two reasons why the sensitivity of TVAAS scores does not threaten the internal validity of my models. When RDD 
assumptions are met, controls are not needed to address bias. To the extent these assumptions are not met, the sensitivity of TVAAS scores could 
only bias estimated treatment effects if treatment is correlated with the circumstances affecting the sensitivity of TVAAS scores. There is no 
reason to believe this is the case. While student controls could be omitted from TLM models on these same grounds, these models use much 
smaller samples, decreasing statistical power. I offset some of the loss in power by using student controls in TLM models. 
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I examine TLM and TVAAS scores for three reasons: robustness checks, power, and 
policy-relevance. By controlling for lagged TLM scores in models where the outcome is TLM 
math/ RLA scores, the model is effectively measuring the achievement gains of the typical (i.e. 
mean) student. Models in which the outcome is TVAAS (with no lagged outcome) also 
effectively measure gains in student achievement. However, estimates produced by these models 
are based on different samples. Briefly, TVAAS scores use data from all students taught by a 
teacher. But, some students receive all content instruction from one teacher, others do not (e.g. 
20% of a student’s math instruction may come from one teacher, 80% from a second). TLM 
samples are restricted to the former. For reasons described below, this restriction removes some 
ambiguities about the receipt of treatment. Second, more than just math/ RLA teachers receive 
TVAAS scores. This, substantially increases the size of TVAAS samples. Third, in the 
Tennessee study context, TLM and TVAAS are two of the most policy-relevant measures of 
student growth. 
 
Longer-Term and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
My main findings concern the extent to which the number of observations a teacher 
receives per year affects her contemporaneous performance. However, there are other policy 
relevant effects, namely, longer-term and heterogeneous effects. 
 
Longer-Term Effects 
 Prior research and conventional wisdom implies observations should affect 
contemporaneous employee (i.e. teacher) performance (Guerin, 1993; Kraft & Gilmour, 2016a; 
Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). However, the effects of observations conducted during an 
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academic year may not materialize until subsequent academic years (extended effect). It is also 
plausible that observations do not affect teacher performance until teachers receive some 
accumulated number of observation cycles over time (cumulative effect).  
Extended and cumulative effects are especially plausible if educators use post-
observation feedback to identify areas of weakness, then engage in in/ formal professional 
development to improve performance. Implicitly, it takes time for this process to affect teacher 
performance. Therefore, teachers may not have time to appreciably improve their performance 
by the end of the school year during which they received their observations. To explore extended 
and cumulative effects I modify equations 1 and 2.  
 I estimate the extended effect using the following RDD: (3)			%&'( = *+ + -./01 &',(IJ + 23(·) + 56&'( + 78'( + 9( + :&'(, <=>?&',(IJ< ≤ A (4)	./0&',(IJ = *+̈ + DE(IJ(·) + 2̈3(·) + 5̈6&'( + 7̈8'( + 9( + F&'(, <=>?&',(IJ< ≤ A 
The key difference between equations 3 and 4, and equations 1 and 2, is the year during which 
observations and the running variable were measured. In the original models, the number of 
observations a teacher received per year and outcomes of interest were both measured in year t 
(i.e. the predictor over the year, outcomes after completion of all observations). In equation 1, I 
predicted the number of policy-assigned observations a teacher received using certification status 
from year t and lagged LOE-cont (i.e. LOE measured in year t – 1). In equations 3 and 4, the 
predictor of interest and instruments are lagged by an additional year, but the outcomes are not. 
The instruments are certification in t – 1 and LOE-cont measured in year t – 2, and the predictor 
of interest is the number of observations received in year t – 1. All controls and outcomes from 
equations 1 and 2 remain unchanged. Thus, in equations 3 and 4, d represents the effect of an 
additional observation per year on the outcomes measured one year after treatment.  
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 I use a full-sample RDD (i.e. RDD not restricted to local bandwidths) instead of the local 
RDD to estimate the effects of the total number of observations received through year t (i.e. 
cumulative observations) because few teachers remain in the local RDD bandwidths over time. 
To estimate the cumulative effect, I use the following model: (5)			%&'( = *+ + -M_./0O &'( + 23P(·) + 56&'( + 78'( + 9( + :&'( (6)	M_./0&'( = *+̈ + RM_S.T&'( + 2̈3P(·) + 5̈6&'( + 7̈8'( + 9( + F&'(  
Equations 5 and 6 include two new variables: M_./0&'( and M_S.T&'(. The cumulative observations 
received (M_./0&'() and policy-assigned observations (M_S.T&'() represent the number of 
observations received since the 2011-12 school year and number of policy-assigned observations 
assigned over this same period, respectively. The number of cumulative policy-assigned 
observations assigned to a teacher is based on the TDOE observation assignment schedule13. 
Thus, the full-sample RDD isolates exogenous variation in cumulative observations received 
using policy-assigned cumulative observations.  
Equations 5 and 6 also include previously seen variables: %&'( , 6&'(, 8'(  and 9( refer to the 
same quantities as in previous equations. 3P is a higher order LOE polynomial interacted with 
certification status. As a full-sample RDD, it is important 3P is correctly specified. I added higher 
degrees of LOE-cont until the last term added was insignificant, which happened after adding the 
cubic term. Thus, 3P is a second order polynomial14.  
 
                                               
13 I assign teachers of tested subjects fewer observations when there are discrepancies between their discrete lagged LOE and TVAAS. 
14 I estimated full-sample RDDs using up to a fourth-degree polynomial. Results are insensitive to higher order polynomials. 
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Heterogeneous Effects by Teacher and School Characteristics 
Research reviewed in the Heterogeneity in the Effectiveness of Observations section 
implies the effectiveness of observations may depend on some teacher, observer, and school 
characteristics. Specifically, the reviewed literature suggests there may be heterogeneous effects 
with respect to: teacher years of experience; teacher perceptions about the utility and fairness of 
the evaluation/ observation system and perceptions about observer expertise; and grade levels 
(e.g. elementary, middle).  
It is also plausible that there are heterogeneous effects with respect to school 
administrator effectiveness. Prior research finds the effectiveness of observations as tools for 
formative evaluation depend on observer expertise with respect to content (Hill & Grossman, 
2013) and facilitation of post-observation feedback sessions (Cherasaro et al., 2016). While 
TDOE does not directly measure these constructs, it collects multiple measures of school 
administrator effectiveness. I also explore heterogeneous effects with respect to these measures 
of administrator effectiveness (for more information these measures see Appendix H).  
 
Data 
This dissertation uses TDOE administrative and survey data from 2012-13 through 2014-
15. I use data from the Tennessee Educator Survey15 (TES) in robustness tests and to estimate 
some heterogeneous effects.  
To construct the predictor of interest I draw on a rich set of TEAM observation data from 
2012-13 through 2014-15. Associated with each observation record are unique teacher, observer, 
                                               
15 The annual survey administered by TDOE is now the “Tennessee Educator Survey.” During the study period this survey was called the “Race 
to the Top Survey” and the “First to the Top Survey.” 
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and school identifiers, and observation event characteristics including whether the observation 
was unannounced/ announced/ a walkthrough, and the date on which observers entered these 
data into the TDOE administrative data system. These data include 45 duplicated records. I retain 
one copy of each duplicate. I calculate the number of observations a teacher receives within a 
school year using the total number of these unique records per teacher.  
Control variables include teacher demographics/ characteristics and evaluation scores. 
Teacher demographic data come from 2012-13 through 2014-15 certification files, and survey 
and staff files from the same academic years. Professional certification files contain certification 
information (i.e. Professional/ Apprentice). TDOE staff16 files include teacher: years of 
experience, education level, race/ ethnicity, and gender. Administrative data include lagged and 
then-current achievement, growth, and observation scores from 2012-13 through 2014-15; these 
data are used to calculate LOE-cont. Administrative data also include the TVAAS scores, 
summative TEAM observation scores for all teachers, and unique teacher and school identifiers.  
I combine student data with the aforementioned datasets using unique student and teacher 
identifiers17. Test score data include scaled math and RLA accountability test scores in grades 
three through eight, and high school end of course assessments in English I, II, and III, and 
algebra I and II. I standardize achievement scores by grade-subject. Student data also include 
multiple variables measuring student demographics/ characteristics.  
Some robustness and moderating analyses use TES data. All Tennessee teachers receive 
the TES in late spring of each academic year. Response rates exceeded 50% during the study 
period.  
                                               
16 Some teachers were missing demographic data. If these teachers took the TES they often supplied demographic information. In cases where 
staff file information was missing and TES demographics were not I overwrote the former with the latter.  
17 All analyses exclude students who took alternative achievement tests designed for students with exceptional needs. This does not mean 
analyses exclude special education students. Special education students can take the standard achievement test.  
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Sample Restrictions 
Analytical samples are restricted in different ways for different analyses. I exclude 
teachers whose LOE-cont scores do not place them in the expected LOE (e.g. a record shows an 
LOE-cont of 420 but LOE5) from the sample. Over the study period there were 1730 such 
records, or 0.9% of the population of evaluated Tennessee teachers. Discrepancies between a 
discrete and LOE-cont can exist for at least three reasons: override rules (e.g. 3/4/5 or 4/5 
overrides), appeals, or clerical errors18.  
I restrict analytical samples used to estimate the relationship between observations and 
TLM scores in ways that do not apply to TVAAS samples. I discard students if a single teacher 
did not claim 100% of the student’s math or RLA instructional time, and retain high school 
students only if their end-of-course (EOC) exam occurred in the spring. I make both restrictions 
due to concerns about receipt of treatment.  
Due to data limitations, it is ambiguous when some students were assigned to a given 
teacher, so it is unclear how many observations a teacher received when teaching certain 
students. Teachers of tested subjects must claim some percentage of content (e.g. math, RLA) 
instructional time for each student they teach. If 40% of Student X’s RLA instruction comes 
from Teacher A and 60% from Teacher B, Teachers A and B would claim 40% and 60% RLA 
instructional time, respectively. Such claims could mean Teacher A taught Student X for the first 
40% of the school year and Teacher B taught Student X the remainder of the year. However, it is 
not necessarily the case that the time over which a teacher claims a student’s instructional time 
                                               
18 Districts can adopt override rules allowing teachers of tested subjects with growth scores higher than their LOE to override their LOE with the 
higher growth score. It is also possible for teachers to appeal for a higher LOE on the basis that something about their evaluations were conducted 
incorrectly. Finally, there are bound to be some errors due to clerical oversight or programming.  
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be unbroken. Student X could start and end the year with Teacher A, while receiving instruction 
during the middle of the year from Teacher B. Since I do not know when a student taught by 
multiple teachers in the same content area was taught by a particular teacher, I do not know how 
many observations the teacher received while the student was assigned to them. For example, if a 
teacher claimed 20% of a student’s content instructional time, this does not necessarily mean the 
teacher received 20% or 80% of her observations while the student was assigned to them. Not 
knowing when a student was assigned to a teacher clouds the relationship between treatment, 
teacher behaviors, and student learning. I forego making potentially dubious assumptions about 
these relationships and drop students if they did not receive 100% of their content instruction 
from a single teacher. Of the approximately 2,412,000 (3,011,000) records associated with 
grades 4-12 math (RLA) students during the study period, approximately 391,000 (1,016,000) 
records were dropped because of this sample restriction.  
I drop high school students who did not take spring EOC exams for similar reasons. 
Nearly all students take an EOC exam at the end of fall or spring. Fall administrations tend to 
occur near the mid-point of the academic year. Thus, high school students taking fall EOC exams 
spend at least the first half of an academic year with one content teacher (i.e. one teacher because 
of the previous sample restriction). Ideally, I could tabulate the number of observations received 
by high school teachers of fall EOC test-takers through the fall semester of each study year to 
determine how many observations these teachers received to that point. Unfortunately, I cannot 
precisely determine when teachers received their observations within the academic year. TDOE 
administrative data include “observation dates,” but I have learned these are the dates on which 
observers entered these data into the TEAM system, not dates on which observations necessarily 
occurred. This raises questions about the number of observations teachers of fall test-takers 
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received prior to the exam19. I therefore discard high school students who took their EOC exam 
in the fall. This sample restriction resulted in dropping an additional 64,000 (133,000) fall EOC 
test-takers in math (RLA) records over the study period.  
Since I know more about the relationships among observations received, time a teacher 
spent with a student, and EOC test scores, I check the sensitivity of my main findings to this last 
sample restriction, retaining all high school EOC fall test-takers. Results produced by this less 
restrictive sample are statistically indistinguishable from results produced by the restricted 
sample.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 includes some descriptive statistics for the sample used in a bandwidth of 40 (i.e. 
the largest bandwidth used, see Chapter 5 for details) when the outcome is TVAAS scores. In 
this sample the typical teacher is a white female, holds more than a BA/ BS degree, and has 
approximately 13 years of experience. The typical TEAM score is 4.07 on a scale of [1, 5] and 
the standard deviation of the annual change in TEAM scores is 0.40. The average TVAAS score 
is 2.12, meaning the typical teacher in my sample contributed 2.12 normal curve equivalents to 
her students’ achievement compared to what these students would have scored if they were 
taught by the hypothetical average Tennessee teacher (SAS, 2016). Moreover, a TVAAS score of 
2.12 represents an approximate gain of 0.10 on the scale of standardized student achievement 
scores. The standard deviation of the annual change in these TVAAS is 6.15 normal curve 
equivalents, or approximately 0.29 on the scale of standardized student achievement scores. 
                                               
19 For example, suppose a teacher receives four observations over the course of the school year and administrative data suggest the second 
observation occurred January 10. Now suppose this teacher’s students took an achievement test on December 10. Due to ambiguity in the timing 
of observations received, it is unclear if this teacher received 25% or 50% of treatment prior to the achievement tests administered on December 
10. 
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Table 2 shows approximately 90% of the pooled local sample in a bandwidth of 40 includes 
teachers originally from the 425 threshold, and about 85% of this sample is Professional 
teachers.  
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for records when the outcomes are TLM math or 
RLA scores and the running variable is restricted a bandwidth of 40. The typical teacher in both 
samples resembles the typical teacher in the sample described in Table 2. Roughly 50% of a 
math/ RLA teacher’s students are female, 14% are black, 77% are white, and 7% Hispanic. 
Slightly over half a teacher’s students have FRPL status, 8% are ESL, and 2% have immigrant 
status. Again, almost 95% of the sample in a bandwidth of 40 when the outcomes are TLM math 
or RLA scores is Professional teachers near the 425 threshold. 
Considering that a very large percentage of the analytical samples come from records 
surrounding the 425 threshold, it is useful to know the teacher population distribution of LOE. 
During the study period, LOE1, LOE2, LOE3, LOE4, and LOE5 teachers comprised < 1%, 9%, 
22%, 33%, and 36% of the population of Tennessee teachers, respectively. Thus, almost 70% of 
Tennessee teachers are in LOE4 or LOE5.  
 
Summary 
 I draw on multiple years of Tennessee Department of Education administrative data and 
use two-stage regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effects of an additional observation 
on: value-added (TVAAS) scores, and teacher-year level mean standardized student scores in 
math and reading/ language arts. I also estimate longer-term effects, and heterogeneous effects 
based on teacher and school characteristics.  
In the next chapter, I present evidence regarding threats to internal validity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THREATS TO INTERNAL VALIDITY 
 
Introduction  
In this chapter I present evidence concerning the assumptions of a 2SLS RDD research 
design. I share findings regarding manipulation of the running variable and the imbalance of 
covariates at the 200 and 425 thresholds. I also present some evidence concerning the validity of 
the instruments.  
 
Manipulation of the Running Variable 
Manipulation of the running variable is a standard threat to causal inference in RDDs. 
The concern is that LOE-cont scores have been manipulated such that teachers possessing some 
confounding characteristic are strategically placed just to one side of the cut score in the running 
variable. For example, observers might wish to place teachers with historically high student 
achievement scores just above the 425 threshold regardless of what the observer sees during 
classroom observations. Given how LOE-cont is determined, such manipulation is practically 
infeasible. Observers would need a keen prescience concerning teacher growth and achievement 
levels to situate LOE scores just to one side of the LOE 200 (or 425) threshold since teachers do 
not receive their achievement and growth scores until the completion of all observations. Thus, 
observers wanting to manipulate LOE in this fashion would have to rely on historic measures of 
teacher performance to guess current year values. However, the polychoric correlation between 
growth (achievement) levels from year t and t – 1 is 0.50 (0.37). These conditions suggest it is 
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practically impossible for an observer to strategically place a teacher just to one side of a 
threshold.  
Researchers often empirically test for manipulation. Conventional tests of manipulation 
identify relatively large discontinuities in the probability density function of the running variable 
as evidence of manipulation. However, given that the LOE-cont variable comprises three 
components, two of which take integer values, the probability density function of this variable 
exhibits spikes at multiples of five (see Appendix D). I therefore test for manipulation of the 
observation score assuming observers were prescient and knew teacher achievement and growth 
scores in advance, an unrealistic assumption. If there is no evidence of manipulation under this 
assumption, manipulation of LOE-cont under more realistic conditions is even more 
implausible20. 
I empirically test for manipulation using robust-bias correction approaches developed by 
Cattaneo, Jannson, and Ma (2016). There is no evidence observers systematically manipulated 
scores at the 425 threshold, and this finding is robust to the use triangular and epanechnikov 
kernel functions. Furthermore, there is no evidence of manipulation at the 200-threshold using 
the epanechnikov kernel function (robust-bias corrected p-value = 0.68). There is evidence of 
manipulation at the 200 threshold when using the triangular kernel function (p-value = 0.0001). 
However, it is important to remember this finding is predicated on the assumption of observer 
prescience. Even if one suspects there may have been manipulation at this threshold, there is no 
such evidence at the 425 threshold. For this reason, as well as others described below, I present 
results separately in which the analysis sample has been restricted to teachers in the 
neighborhood of the 425 threshold.  
                                               
20 I do this by dropping the achievement and growth LOE-cont components because these components only take integer values. I check for 
manipulation in the approximately continuous observation scores.  
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Covariate Balance 
In an RDD it is important that there are no discontinuities in pre-treatment and time-
invariant observables at the cut point (Morgan & Winship, 2007; Murnane & Willett, 2011). 
Such discontinuities raise concerns about discontinuities in unobserved confounding variables 
even after controlling for observables. For example, suppose teachers just below the 425-
threshold have substantially lower prior TLM scores than teachers above the threshold. Prior 
TLM scores may be negatively related to teacher motivation, which almost certainly has a 
positive relationship with teacher performance (i.e. student growth). Indeed, school 
administrators may assign students with lower prior achievement scores to highly motivated 
teacher because of this relationship. However, school administrators may observe more 
motivated teachers less frequently, negatively biasing estimates. 
 Because variation in the instrumented number of observations received is based on 
discontinuities at the 200 and 425 thresholds for both Apprentice and Professional teachers, I 
conduct balance checks for each of these four groups. To conduct these tests, I use the equation: (7)			V&'( = W+ + DXE′(·) + 2X3(·) + 5X6′&'( + 7X8'( + 9( + S&'( , <=>?&'(< ≤ A 
X’ is the original X vector but does not include covariate x. All other variables refer to the same 
quantities described in previous sections. I estimate equation 7 once at each of the 200 and 425 
thresholds, once for each of the five elements in V&'( and lagged TVAAS, once each for 
Professional and Apprentice teachers, and once for each of the RDD bandwidths of 20, 30, and 
40. This results in a total of 72 estimates. Balance tests at the 200 threshold suggest there are no 
systematic imbalances (see Table 4). However, there is evidence of a systematic imbalance in 
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teacher race at the 425 threshold for Apprentice teachers (see Table 5). To the extent this is 
evidence of bias, I estimate some effects using only Professional teachers at the 425 threshold. 
 I also check the balance of covariates from TLM models. In results not shown, tests at the 
200 threshold showed substantial imbalance, weakening the claim that teachers on either side of 
the 200 threshold are equivalent. To the extent bias exists at the 200 threshold, I separate effects 
by threshold. 
Table 6 displays results from balance tests at the 425 threshold using samples when the 
outcomes are TLM student achievement (156 more tests). At face value, there appear to be some 
discontinuities in the covariates at the 425 threshold. It appears Professional teachers just below 
the threshold have at least 1.5 fewer years of experience in the bandwidths of 20. However, 
outliers drive this discontinuity: a few Professional teachers above the 425 threshold have more 
than 50 years of experience. Table 6 includes a balance test using censored years of experience, 
in which I assign21 years of experience greater than 10 a value of 10. There is no discontinuity in 
censored years of experience, so I conclude teacher years of experience does not pose a 
threatening imbalance. After ruling out the significant imbalance in years of experience, there are 
five more imbalances for Apprentice teachers and three for Professional teachers. To the extent 
the imbalance of Apprentice teacher covariates introduces bias, I estimate some samples using 
only 425-Professional teachers. The only significant result in Table 6 associated with 425-
Professional teachers is a negligible imbalance in the proportion of a teacher’s students assigned 
to ESL. When a Professional teacher is just below the 425 threshold, the proportion of her 
students who are ESL is 0.01 lower than Professional teachers just above 425. 
 
                                               
21 Prior work suggests returns to experience after 10 years on the job are relatively small (Harris & Sass, 2011; Papay & Kraft, 2013).  
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Validity of Instrumental Variables 
If alternative treatments exist at the 200 (LOE1/ LOE2) or 425 (LOE4/ LOE5) thresholds, 
this would threaten the internal validity of the instruments. No other state policies exist at the 
200 or 425 thresholds22, but some state policies depend on other thresholds (e.g. LOE2/ LOE3 
triggers teacher tenure). While policy-assigned threats are implausible, psychological effects 
could threaten the internal validity of my instruments. Each of these threats exist because 
crossing the 200 or 425 thresholds may induce behaviors affecting the outcomes of interest, 
independent of observations. There are three potential, threatening psychological effects. 
Teachers assigned to lower LOE may face an impetus to improve independent of the observation 
process (“impetus to improve”). Lower performing teachers, especially LOE1 teachers, may 
depart the profession via self-exit or dismissal, and knowledge of an impending departure may 
lead to demoralization, negatively affecting the outcomes of interest (“impending departure”). 
Finally, assignment to a higher LOE, particularly assignment to LOE5, may induce a substantial 
boost in teacher self-efficacy resulting in improved performance independent of the observation 
process (“psychological boost”). If these psychological threats exist, the first would positively 
bias the estimates of interest and the rest would induce negative bias. 
Below I discuss some findings concerning the impetus to improve, impending departure, 
and psychological boost. There is no systematic evidence any of these psychological effects 
threatens the validity of the instruments. After presenting main findings in the next chapter, I 
present more results concerning the psychological boost, and present new findings from a 
generic falsification test for threatening psychological effects. 
 
                                               
22 While it is possible crossing the 200 or 425 threshold triggers district policies, I am unaware of any strong district incentives at these 
thresholds.  
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Impetus to Improve 
 Teachers assigned to lower LOE may face more of an impetus to improve than teachers 
in higher LOE, independent of the observation process. This impetus may exist due to socio-
professional pressure (e.g. teachers in higher LOE have more prestige), to avoid punitive 
consequences, or other reasons. This impetus could cause LOE1 (LOE4) teachers to improve 
more than LOE2 (LOE5) teachers, inducing upward bias.  
 If such an impetus exists, evidence to that effect should appear in teachers’ responses to 
items on the annual educator survey (the TES) asking about their efforts to improve. Teachers 
were asked to report the number of hours they spent in professional development focused on 
approximately ten different aspects of teaching (e.g. pedagogy, classroom management). I added 
these reported hours together, generating a sum of the total number of hours teachers reported 
engaging in PD (PDhrs). A second set of items asked teachers to list the number of times they 
collaborated (tchcollab) with other teachers for various purposes (e.g. improve instruction). An 
impetus to improve may have driven such collaboration. A third item asked about the total 
amount of time teachers spent preparing for classroom observations (obshrs). A fourth item 
asked a similar question concerning the amount of time teachers spent trying to improve their 
instruction (insthrs). Finally, fourteen items asked teachers about the extent to which they 
exerted more time or effort (effortsum) on various activities (e.g. lesson prep, reflecting on 
teaching). I dichotomized each of the 14 responses, then found the sum of the binary responses to 
produce the effortsum outcome. Appendix E contains these items and their original scales, 
descriptions of how I transformed items from their original scales and lists the years during 
which items were administered on the TES. Table 7 contains some descriptive statistics of these 
measures.  
  
 
45 
 Using OLS23 I regress these survey outcomes on: the four instruments and other 
covariates from equations 1 and 2. F-tests of the joint significance of the instruments are 
presented in Table 8. In a bandwidth of 20 (30) the instruments jointly predict tchcollab and 
effortsum (obshrs), but the instruments do not predict these outcomes in other bandwidths. 
Closer inspection reveals the 200-Professional (b[121.16], SE [33.096]) and 200-Apprentice 
(b[161.07], SE [53.458]) instruments positively predict tchcollab in a bandwidth of 20. The 200-
Apprentice instrument negatively predicts effortsum in a bandwidth of 20 (b[-32.24], SE 
[10.244]). And, the 200-Professional and 425-Professional instruments positively predict obshrs 
in a bandwidth of 30 (respectively, b[1.18] SE [0.483] and b[0.21] SE [0.095]). 
Considering the aforementioned threats to internal validity at the 200-threshold, I 
estimate new RDDs restricted to teachers in bandwidths surrounding the 425 threshold. Results 
from these models are in Table 9. The 425-threshold instruments do not jointly predict any of the 
impetus to improve outcomes.  
 There is little reason to believe the instruments are threatened by an impetus to improve. 
Instruments in the pooled sample (Table 8) do not predict survey outcomes across bandwidths. In 
the 425-threshold sample the instruments are not jointly predictive of any survey outcomes in 
any bandwidth. To the extent 200-threshold instruments are related to improvement efforts, I 
estimate some effects only using teachers surrounding the 425-threshold. 
It is possible test results are sensitive to the operationalization of survey items (e.g. 
adding all PD items together). I explore the sensitivity of findings presented in this section to 
different operationalizations (see Appendix F). Sensitivity analyses produce qualitatively similar 
results.  
                                               
23 When treating survey outcomes as ordinal or multinomial there was no evidence the proportional-odds assumption was valid and multinomial 
logit models failed to converge.  
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Impending Departure 
 Assignment to a lower LOE (especially LOE1) may lead a teacher to quit or lead school 
administrators to dismiss the teacher. In either case, it is plausible that knowledge of an 
impending teacher departure/ dismissal could lead the teacher and/ or administrator to abandon 
teacher improvement efforts. Such abandonment could threaten the validity of the instrument and 
negatively bias subsequent estimates of the relationship between observations and teacher 
performance.  
 To explore the potential threat of an impending departure, I again use equation 2. I 
regress whether a teacher quits teaching (i.e. not present in administrative data the subsequent 
year) on the set of right-hand side variables from equation 2 (i.e. one-stage local RDD). The 
predicted outcomes and 95% confidence intervals (CI) produced by these local RDDs are 
represented in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the 200-threshold point estimates exhibit expected 
patterns: LOE1 teachers are more likely to quit than LOE2 teachers. However, these point 
estimates are imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant. There is little difference in the 
estimates of LOE4 and LOE5 teachers.  
 
Psychological Performance Boost 
LOE5 teachers may experience a substantial psychological boost enhancing their 
performance relative to LOE4 teachers. Although recent research finds teacher self-efficacy is 
not predictive of changes in student achievement (Jackson, Rockoff, & Staiger, 2014), earlier 
education research claims the opposite: enhancing employee self-efficacy is associated with 
teacher performance improvements (Hoy & Woolfolk, 1993; Raudenbush, Rowan, & Cheong, 
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1992). Thus, a boost in the self-efficacy of LOE5 teachers increase student performance for 
reasons independent of the observation process, introducing negative bias.  
In this section, I present tests concerning the effects of crossing the 425 threshold on 
teacher perceptions about the observation/ evaluation system. The basis for a teacher’s 
psychological boost is a score produced by the TEAM system. Research in social psychology 
finds people (i.e. teachers) typically perceive the world in ways reinforcing their self-image 
(Baumeister, 1998). I hypothesize that if the TEAM system brings about a psychological boost 
for teachers, these teachers will have a more positive view of the evaluation/ observation system. 
I characterize these tests as checks for “reinforcing perceptions.”  
Five TES items arguably measure some reinforcing perceptions. The first item measures 
whether a teacher believes evaluations will improve teaching (imprvtch). TES also asked 
teachers if their post-observation feedback was useful (fbuseful) and if their observers were 
qualified to conduct observations (obsqual). The fourth and fifth items asked teachers if they 
changed their teaching due to evaluations (chngtch) and if evaluations were fair (faireval). 
Responses to each of these items were originally on a four-point scale from Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree. I dichotomized responses so Agree/ Strongly Agree became one and Disagree/ 
Strongly Disagree became zero (see Appendix E for details). None of these items directly 
measure the construct of interest (i.e. perceptions of the TEAM observation/ evaluation that 
reinforce positive self-image due to LOE5 assignment). But, it seems unlikely that teachers 
whose self-image depends on a perceived trait established by the TEAM evaluation system 
would have more negative views of this system than teachers in lower levels of effectiveness. To 
explore this hypothesis, I use tests similar to those in the Impetus to Improve section. Results 
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from these new tests are in Table 10. There is no evidence the instruments are threatened by a 
psychological performance boost.  
Again, results from reinforcing perceptions tests could be sensitive to the 
operationalization of survey items. I explore the sensitivity of findings presented in this section 
to different operationalizations (see Appendix F). Sensitivity tests yield qualitatively similar 
results. 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter I presented evidence concerning internal validity. I argued that 
manipulation of the running variable is implausible and devised a test able to rule out 
manipulation at the 425-threshold. Balance tests found some covariates are imbalanced. To the 
extent these tests suggest bias is present, I estimate effects using samples meeting the 
assumptions of regression discontinuity designs.  
I also presented evidence concerning the validity of the instruments. Over 126 tests (90 
impetus to improve, six impending departure, 30 reinforcing perceptions), five detected 
relationships between individual instruments and potentially threatening psychological effects, 
no more than expected by chance when accepting a Type I error rate of 5%. These findings hold 
over different operationalizations of survey items (see Appendix F). There is strong evidence 
supporting the validity of the instruments.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I present evidence concerning the effects of classroom observations on 
teacher performance. To identify these effects, I use multiple years of statewide administrative 
data from Tennessee with fuzzy regression discontinuity designs (RDD). Fuzzy RDDs are 
needed because educators do not comply with observation assignment schedules produced by the 
state. And, for reasons previously discussed, it is plausible non-compliance is endogenous.  
In the preceding chapter I presented some evidence supporting the validity of my 
instruments. After discussing my main findings, I present further evidence corroborating the 
validity of instruments. I end this chapter with a discussion of heterogeneous effects.  
  
Main Findings 
I first discuss findings from models when the outcome is TVAAS scores. I generate RDD 
estimates in bandwidths of 20, 30, and 40. The Imbens-Kalyanaraman (IK) bandwidth selector 
(2012) estimated optimal bandwidths of approximately 35 and 20, respectively, at the 200 and 
425 thresholds. My bandwidths bracket the optimal bandwidths24. Table 11 presents findings 
from the pooled RDD in the left panel. To the extent the assumptions of a fuzzy RDD are not 
met at the 200-threshold or for 425-Apprentice teachers, I present estimates using only 
                                               
24 I also estimated optimal bandwidths using the cross-validation (CV) method proposed by Ludwig and Miller (2007), but this estimator yielded 
optimal bandwidths of 75 at the 200 and 425 thresholds. The difference from one LOE to the next is 75, which is why I ignored the CV estimated 
bandwidth.  
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Professional teachers surrounding the 425 threshold in the right panel. As seen in the bottom-left 
and bottom-right panels, the instruments strongly predict the number of observations received. 
Second stage estimates in the top-left panel show an additional observation leaves TVAAS 
scores unchanged25. The insignificant effect of an additional observation on TVAAS scores 
hovers near zero. The top-right panel of Table 11 shows qualitatively similar results: there is no 
evidence an additional observation changes TVAAS scores.  
 Estimates produced by the pooled local RDD when the outcomes are TLM student 
achievement scores in Table 12. Second stage estimates in the top panel of Table 12 suggest the 
marginal observation lowers teacher level mean math achievement by approximately -0.10 units 
or roughly one-fifth of a standard deviation in the change of these scores (see Table 3 for 
descriptive statistics). The estimated effects on RLA scores are also negative, but insignificant. 
Table 13 shows second stage estimates for all teachers surrounding the 425 threshold, and results 
for Professional teacher surrounding these thresholds for reasons similar to the sample restriction 
in Table 11. All controls are the same as those used in models that produced the results presented 
in Table 12. The top panel of Table 13 shows estimates for math/ RLA teachers surrounding the 
425 threshold. These point estimates are qualitatively similar to those in Table 12, but none of 
the estimates in Table 13 are significant. These results hold after restricting the sample to 
Professional teachers surrounding the 425 threshold (see bottom panel Table 13).  
 
                                               
25 LATEs produced by pooled and unpooled local RDDs assume linearity. For example, the LATE of going from two to the three observations is 
the same as going from four to five. However, the effect of an additional observation may be non-linear (i.e. depend on number of observations 
received). I return to this point after discussing results produced by full-sample RDDs. 
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Longer-Term Effects 
 Although I have not found any evidence that an additional observation improves 
contemporaneous teacher performance, it is plausible observation-driven improvement takes 
time. In this section I present findings related to two longer-term effects of interest: the extended 
and cumulative effects of observations on teacher performance.  
Table 14 presents the extended effects of observations. The top panel displays results 
using the pooled sample and all four instruments. I also present estimates produced by restricted 
samples in the bottom panel for aforementioned reasons. The extended effects resemble my main 
findings: across outcomes and bandwidths most point estimates are negative and all are 
insignificant. Estimated cumulative effects (see Table 15) are qualitatively similar to previous 
results, but, for the first time, all estimates are significantly negative.  
 
Remaining Psychological Threats to the Validity of Local RDD Instruments 
 In the previous chapter I discussed three threats to the validity of instruments used in the 
local RDD: an impetus to improve, impending departure, and psychological performance boost.  
In this section I discuss one more test examining the threat of a psychological boost and present 
findings from a generic falsification test of psychological effects. This new evidence further 
corroborates the validity of my instruments.  
 
Psychological Performance Boost, Performance Loss 
In theory, a teacher should not receive an LOE5 unless they exceed expectations. 
Conferral of LOE5 may lead a teacher to believe she is exceptional, boosting self-efficacy to the 
point that she takes instructional risks ultimately leading to higher student achievement. If 
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assignment to LOE5 boosts performance via psychological gains, behavioral economics implies 
the loss of LOE5 should cause even greater psychological losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
This implies the effect of the marginal observation for LOE4 teachers assigned to LOE5 in the 
previous year should be more negative than LOE4 teachers whose previous LOE assignment was 
less than LOE5.  
 I estimate LOE5-loss moderated effects by returning to equations 1 and 2. First, I  
create a dummy variable (LOE5to4) taking a value of one if an LOE4 teacher in year t (i.e. once-
lagged LOE) was LOE5 in year t – 1 (i.e. twice-lagged LOE), otherwise the variable is zero. This 
dummy variable is interacted with 425-threshold instruments and the endogenous variable. Aside 
from these interactions, the LOE5-loss sample differs from the original local RDD samples in 
two ways. I restrict the sample to teachers surrounding the 425 threshold because this 
psychological threat only pertains to LOE5 teachers. And, the LOE5-loss samples are smaller 
due to my use of a twice-lagged variable.  
  I present the LOE5-loss moderated effects on TVAAS and TLM scores in Table 16. 
None of the interactions in any model are significant, meaning there is no evidence of a 
productivity-losing LOE5 loss. In conjunction with evidence presented in Chapter 4, these new 
results effectively rule out threats to the validity of my instruments due to a psychological boost.  
 
Falsification Tests for Generic Psychological Effects Related to LOE Assignment 
 To some degree, all potentially threatening psychological effects rest on teacher 
assignment to a relatively lower LOE (LOE1/ LOE2 or LOE4/ LOE5). The impetus to improve, 
impending departure, and psychological performance boost are supposedly brought about by 
assignment to a lower (higher in the case of the psychological performance boost) LOE. Across 
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these psychological effects, the threat to internal validity is that assignment to a lower LOE 
causes a change in teacher performance independent of the observation process. If such 
psychological effects exist at the 200 or 425 thresholds, they should exist at other thresholds 
without discontinuities in the assignment of observations. Thus, assignment to LOE2 instead of 
LOE3 (LOE3 instead of LOE4) should affect teacher performance if assignment to a lower 
threshold induces a psychological effect.  
I test for the presence of generic psychological effects due to LOE assignment using 
equation 8:   (8)			%&'( = *+ + -[&'( + 2\(·) + 56&'( + 78'( + 9( + :&'(, <=>?&'(< ≤ A 
which resembles equations 1 and 2. The key differences between equation 8, and equations 1 and 
2, is the use of different instruments and thresholds in the running variable. Equation 8 does not 
represent a pooled RDD, but two separate RDDs.  
 The results of this falsification test suggest a generic psychological effect related to LOE 
assignment does not bias the main findings. Table 17 shows crossing the 275 or 350 threshold is 
unrelated to TVAAS or TLM math or RLA scores. Furthermore, the point estimates are near 
zero.  
 
Heterogeneous Effects by Teacher and School Characteristics 
I estimate heterogeneous effects by: grade levels (e.g. elementary); teacher years of 
experience; teacher perceptions about the utility and fairness of the evaluation/ observation 
system and perceptions about observer expertise; and school administrator effectiveness. To 
create these estimates I interact moderators with the instruments and endogenous variables (see 
Appendix H for details). There is no evidence more observations improve student growth for 
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teachers in any subgroup and weak evidence of heterogeneous effects. Many point estimates vary 
by subgroups as hypothesized, but moderated effects are often statistically indistinguishable from 
one another (i.e. 95% confidence intervals overlap across subgroups). 
Previous research implies more observations would be most useful for teachers in earlier 
grade levels because the typical upper grade observer is unlikely to possess expertise in the 
observed content area of upper grade teachers. Findings in Table 18 partially support this 
hypothesis. Across all outcomes the largest negative point estimates tend to be associated with 
high school teachers. Effects on TVAAS for elementary and middle teachers are close in 
magnitude and significantly less negative than high school estimates (see confidence intervals in 
Table 18). None of the other point estimates are statistically different from one another. 
Prior work also suggests observations would benefit early career teachers the most. There 
is weak evidence supporting this hypothesis when the outcome is TVAAS: point estimates 
become more negative as experience increases (see Table 19). However, the moderated effects 
on TVAAS are statistically indistinguishable over years of experience. When the outcomes are 
TLM scores point estimates do not support the hypothesized moderated relationship (Table 19). 
In broad terms, I hypothesized observations would improve teacher performance more for 
teachers perceiving the evaluation/ observation as relatively more useful or credible. There is 
little evidence supporting this hypothesis (see Appendix H). 
 
Heterogeneity by Measures of Administrator Effectiveness 
The last set of analyses explore if working in schools with more effective administrators, 
as measured by the administrator TEAM system, moderates the LATEs. Like teachers, 
administrators receive a composite effectiveness rating (i.e. LOE) based on observations and 
  
 
55 
student outcomes (e.g. school level value-added scores). I forego a detailed discussion of the 
determinants of administrator TEAM scores and LOE. What is important is the administrator 
evaluation system generates observation scores and LOE allowing me to rank order 
administrators using these measures, the de facto measures of administrator effectiveness in 
Tennessee. If these annual measures differentiate administrator skills/ effectiveness, it is 
plausible teachers working in schools with more skilled/ effective administrators may receive 
relatively more beneficial observations.  
 Theoretically, administrator TEAM and LOE scores measure observation-related and 
non-observation-related effectiveness. If heterogeneity in the effects of observations on teacher 
performance are only sensitive to observation-related administrator skills, admLOE and 
admTEAM may not differentiate among effective observers. At face value, the administrator 
TEAM rubric measures some observation-specific skills. I identify administrator TEAM rubric 
indicators (see Table 34 in Appendix H) describing behaviors directly related to teacher: 
evaluation (admTE) and professional learning (admPL).  
 Ideally, I would moderate LATEs by the admTE, admPL, admTEAM, and admLOE of 
administrators who observed teachers, but the data do not support this type of linkage. 
Administrative data include an “observer identification” variable, but this variable captures who 
enters observation data into the information management system, which is not necessarily the 
person who conducted the observation. For example, a principal may conduct an observation but 
assign an assistant principal to enter observation data into the system. Considering this 
limitation, I calculate the school-year mean admTE, admPL, admTEAM, and admLOE, rank 
order schools by these annual measures, then assign schools to quartiles. These quartiles serve as 
the moderators. Thus, the heterogeneous effects with respect to these moderators estimate if the 
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LATEs of an additional observation on teacher performance depend on the skills/ effectiveness 
of the hypothetically typical (i.e. mean) administrator within the teacher’s school.  
 Results in Table 20 resemble other moderated findings: all point estimates are negative 
and tend to move in the hypothesized direction, but none of the point estimates are statistically 
distinguishable from one another. Across all outcomes, point estimates become less negative as 
admLOE rises (see top panel). This is also true when the outcome is TVAAS scores and 
moderator is admTEAM (see bottom panel). But, the moderation of treatment on TLM scores by 
admTEAM does not follow such clear patterns. Point estimates associated with observers in the 
fourth quartile of admTEAM tend to be the least negative, but some of the most negative LATEs 
are associated with observers in the third quartile of admTEAM.  
 Evidence is inconsistent regarding the hypothesis that administrator observation-specific 
effectiveness, as measured by the administrator TEAM rubric, moderates the effect of 
observations on student growth. Similar to results in Table 20, all estimates are negative and 
statistically indistinguishable from one another. The top panel of Table 21 shows that the most 
negative effects on TVAAS and TLM RLA scores are associated with teachers in schools with 
the least skilled observers regarding teacher evaluation. It is also true that the least negative 
effects on TLM math scores are associated with teachers in schools where observers are the most 
skilled teacher evaluators. These patterns support the hypothesized relationships. However, other 
estimates moderated by admTE do not follow hypothesized patterns.  
The bottom panel of Table 21 shows similarly inconsistent results. As hypothesized, the 
least negative effects on TLM math scores are associated with teachers in schools with the most 
highly rated observers regarding admPL. And, the most and least negative effects on TLM RLA 
are associated with teachers in schools with the least and most highly rated observers concerning 
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their skills in supporting teacher professional learning, respectively. However, other point 
estimates move in unexpected directions. Like previous results, all point estimates are negative 
and there is no strong evidence of heterogeneity.  
 It is possible the scores underlying these four moderators do not measure the type of 
administrator effectiveness that truly matters when it comes to conducting teacher observations 
for formative evaluation. This is especially plausible for admLOE and admTEAM, both of which 
may measure broad, ambiguous administrator behaviors. Yet, the most consistent evidence 
supporting the hypothesis administrator skills moderates the effects of observations on student 
growth came from the admLOE moderator. Moreover, some of the weakest evidence supporting 
this hypothesis is produced by the two moderators that arguably measure observation-specific 
effectiveness: admTE and admPL. A thorough investigation into these patterns is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation but could help practitioners and researchers better understand the 
measurement properties of administrator LOE and TEAM scores. Nevertheless, the results of 
these moderation analyses are clear: despite any strong evidence of heterogeneity, it is clear 
more observations do not improve student growth for teachers in any of the examined subgroups. 
 
Sensitivity Tests: Full-Sample RDDs 
Thus far, there is no evidence observations improve teacher performance. However, it is 
possible the results do not generalize beyond the local RDD bandwidths and/ or lack enough 
power to detect effects. I address these possibilities by estimating RDDs using records from 
across the LOE-cont spectrum (“full-sample RDD”). I use the following models:	(9)	./%0&'( = *+̈ + -./01 &'( + 2̈3P(·) + 5̈6&'( + 7̈8'( + 9( + F&'(  (10)	./0&'( = *+̈ + DS.T_./0&'( + 2̈3P(·) + 5̈6&'( + 7̈8'( + 9( + F&'( 
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Where %&'(  is the TVAAS score, 3_  a higher order polynomial of unpooled lagged LOE-cont 
interacted with teacher certification status26, and all other controls are the same as those used in 
equations 1 and 2. ./0&'( is the endogenous number of observations received. The instrument in 
equation 10 differs from the instruments in previous equations. S.T_./0&'( is the minimum 
number of observations assigned to the ith teacher in school j in year t based on the TDOE 
observation assignment schedule27.  
Estimates produced by the full-sample RDD are qualitatively similar to results produced 
by local RDDs, but all estimates are significant (see left panel of Table 22). Thus, local RDD 
estimates generalize beyond the local bandwidths. The right panel of Table 22 includes full-
sample extended effects estimates (equations 3 and 4 represent models estimating local RDD 
extended effects). Local RDD extended effects were insignificant (see Table 14). Full-sample 
extended effects are either negative and significant, or insignificant.  
 Despite the overwhelming evidence that more observations do not improve 
contemporaneous or future teacher performance, all estimates assume the effects of observations 
on teacher performance are linear. However, it is plausible the effect of an additional observation 
depends on the number of observations received. The receipt of one or two observations per year 
may provide teachers with a manageable amount of feedback they can use to improve. But, the 
receipt of too many may lead to an overwhelming amount of feedback, confusing improvement 
efforts. Alternatively, the receipt of too few observations may not provide enough guidance to be 
                                               
26 Higher degree terms of LOE-cont were added to a polynomial of LOE-cont until the last term was no longer significant. This happened after 
adding the third-degree term, so the polynomial in the full-sample RDD is of the second order.  
27 All teachers of untested subjects with a lagged LOE5 or LOE1 have S.T_./0&'( values of one or four, respectively. All Apprentice 
(Professional) teachers of untested subjects with a lagged LOE below five (above one but below five) should receive a minimum of four (two) 
observations. The minimum number of observations assigned to teachers of tested subjects is somewhat ambiguous. I assign teachers of tested 
subjects the minimum number of observations possible based on their lagged LOE and TVAAS. I first assign a teacher of tested subjects the 
maximum of her lagged discrete TVAAS and LOE, then assign policy-assigned observations using this maximum and their certification status. 
This results in fewer assigned observations when possible. 
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useful. I tested for the presence of non-linear effects in both local and full-sample RDDs in 
Appendix G. There is no evidence of non-linearities.  
 
Summary 
 Evidence presented in this chapter clearly supports the conclusion that more frequent 
observations do not improve contemporaneous or future teacher performance. Neither was it true 
that the accumulation of observations over time improved teacher performance. Furthermore, 
moderation analyses failed to find any evidence of positive effects across different groups of 
teachers. In the next and final chapter, I discuss what might account for these findings and the 
implications of my work. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
Introduction  
In this final chapter, I recapitulate my findings and describe the limitations of my work. 
In brief, I find no evidence that more observations improve teacher performance, but the 
generalizability of this inference may be limited. After interpreting my findings, I speculate why 
my negative and null findings might exist. In broad terms, I hypothesize that the ineffectiveness 
of observations as a formative evaluation tool may rest on the design of the Tennessee 
observation system. I end with implications for policy.  
 
Review of Results and Limitations 
 Throughout the previous chapter I discussed multiple findings about the relationship 
between the number of observations per year and teacher performance. Using RDDs I estimated 
contemporaneous, longer-term, cumulative, and heterogeneous effects. While observer bias 
prevents me from drawing conclusions about the effects of observations on summative 
observation scores (see Appendix E), I found no evidence that the marginal observation 
improves measures of teacher performance based on student growth scores.  
 The collection of effects on TVAAS scores imply more observations lower student 
growth or leave it unchanged. Contemporaneous effects were insignificant (Table 11) or negative 
(Table 22), longer-term effects were also insignificant (Table 14) or negative (Table 22), and the 
cumulative effect of all observations received through year t were negative (Table 15). 
  
 
61 
Moderated effects (Tables 18 – 21) resemble previous findings: all were insignificant or 
negative. Only one moderation analysis found moderately strong evidence of heterogeneous 
effects: the effect on the TVAAS scores of high school teachers is significantly more negative 
than the effects on TVAAS for teachers in other grade levels.  
 Observations change teacher-level mean (TLM) math and reading/ language arts (RLA) 
scores in much the same way. Contemporaneous (Tables 12, 13 and 22), longer-term (Tables 14 
and 22), and cumulative effects (Table 15) were either insignificant or negative. While 
moderation analyses also produced negative or null findings, there was only weak evidence of 
heterogeneous effects on TLM scores.  
 Despite some threats to internal validity, none of these threats challenge the implication 
that more observations do not improve teacher performance. In TVAAS models there was weak 
evidence some Apprentice teacher covariates are imbalanced (Tables 4 and 5). In TLM models 
there was strong evidence of imbalance at the 200-threshold and some evidence of Apprentice 
teacher covariate imbalance at the 425-threshold (Table 6). To the extent these imbalances 
introduce bias, I estimated effects using samples meeting the assumptions of an RDD. Estimates 
in restricted and unrestricted samples are qualitatively similar, no matter the restriction. Finally, 
there is strong evidence supporting the validity of the instruments.  
 
Limitations 
There are three potential limitations concerning the generalizability of my estimates. 
First, local RDD estimates were based on variation predominantly coming from Professional 
teachers surrounding the 425 threshold, and in some instances these teachers comprised the 
entirety of the analytical sample. If effects produced by these samples are sample-specific, this 
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would threaten the generalizability of my findings. I explored this by comparing estimates 
produced by 425-Professional teachers to all teachers surrounding the 425 threshold, all teachers 
surrounding the 200 and 425 threshold, and all teachers (i.e. full-sample RDDs). In all 
circumstances, estimates produced by different models and different samples were qualitatively 
similar. Moreover, even if inferences are restricted to Professional teachers on either side of the 
425 threshold, these conclusions would apply to over 60% of Tennessee teachers.  
The second limitation concerns potential heterogeneity in effects due to the source of 
identifying variation. Observations occur for two broad reasons: policy-assignment and/ or 
educator discretion. All estimated relationships are LATEs, representing the effect of the 
marginal policy-assigned observation on teacher performance. These LATEs may not capture the 
effect of the marginal observation on teacher performance if there is heterogeneity in identifying 
variation. 
Finally, measures of teacher performance are restricted to test-based outcomes (Appendix 
C examines observational ratings, but there is strong evidence of bias in these models). Teachers 
are responsible for more than improving student achievement. Moreover, observations may 
affect other outcomes since rubrics often describe more than just academic behaviors. Future 
work may address other outcomes of interest including student: disciplinary infractions, 
attendance, and course-taking.  
 
Potential Explanatory Mechanisms 
In this section I speculate why more observations do not improve teacher performance. 
Broadly, observers may be ill-equipped to facilitate teacher professional learning via 
observations, and some policies may undermine credibility of the TEAM observation system. 
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Observers may not possess the expertise to recognize high-leverage, content-specific 
teaching behaviors needing improvement. In Chapter 2 I reviewed research suggesting observer 
expertise is an antecedent to effective observations. Considering that the typical observer is a 
school administrator, it is highly unlikely teachers are observed by a content expert. This is 
especially the case in upper grade levels where teachers are not generalists. Indeed, the strongest 
evidence of heterogeneous effects existed when treatment was moderated by grade levels. It is 
plausible observers without content expertise provide misguided post-observation feedback. But, 
to appease their observers/ evaluators, teachers may incorporate this misguided feedback into 
practice, worsening student achievement or leaving it unchanged.  
Second, Tennessee classroom observers may be ill-equipped to effectively facilitate post-
observation feedback conferences. During the study period annual observer training devoted at 
most six hours to the provision of feedback and facilitation of post-observation conferences. Six 
hours per year may not be enough time to fully develop these skills. Moreover, some observers 
may not participate in this training every year. Observers who pass an annual online certification 
exam can test out of annual training. After speaking with some TDOE employees I learned most 
observers pass their annual re-certification tests, so most receive little cumulative training. Yet, 
post-observation feedback is the ostensible linchpin of formative evaluation via observations. 
Considering the lack of training, it is plausible feedback provided by these observers is 
ineffective and potentially damaging to teacher performance. Under this explanation, teachers 
receiving more observations would receive more ineffective feedback (e.g. incoherent, 
inaccurate). Prior work implies the accumulation of ineffective feedback leads employee (i.e. 
teacher) performance astray (Jawahar, 2010; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).  
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In addition to these observer weaknesses, some observation policies may weaken 
credibility of the TEAM observation system. A great deal of prior work suggests employees (i.e. 
teachers) do not act on feedback they believe lacks credibility (Cherasaro et al., 2016; Ilgen et 
al., 1979; Kimball, 2003; Kinicki, Prussia, Wu, & McKee-Ryan, 2004). There are at least three 
reasons why teachers may not act on feedback generated by the TEAM observation system. First, 
the typical classroom observation is expected to last 15 minutes (see Chapter One). Teachers 
may not trust feedback based on such short observations, leading them to ignore it. Second, prior 
work finds observers engage in satisficing behaviors (e.g. shortened post-observation 
conferences) to manage the demands of modern teacher evaluations systems (see Chapter 2). 
Multiple interactions with Tennessee school administrators echo this sentiment: observers say 
they are overly burdened by the TEAM observation system. In conjunction with the brevity of 
classroom observations, short post-observation conferences may further teacher perceptions that 
post-observation feedback is not credible. Third, requiring observers to identify a teacher 
weakness, or area of refinement, after every observation (see Chapter One) may erode the 
importance of post-observation feedback. This policy may raise doubt in a teacher’s mind as to 
whether her area of refinement represents a genuine weakness or an ignorable, compliance-
driven requirement. Moreover, some observers frequently apologize for identifying an area of 
refinement, acknowledging the only reason they identify the weakness is to comply with policy. 
Thus, the design and implementation of the area of refinement policy may lead teachers to 
perceive post-observation feedback as perfunctory and ignorable.  
 
  
 
65 
Implications 
 The potential explanations for my findings imply some policy changes could improve the 
effectiveness of observations. First, teacher performance may be more likely to improve if 
observers possess content-expertise. But, it is unreasonable to expect school administrators to 
become experts in all observed content areas. Instead, districts could form collectives, pool 
resources, and hire cross-district content-specific observers. These observers would conduct 
observations instead of school administrators. It seems reasonable that the typical school 
administrator would welcome this change since prior work suggests school administrators are 
overly burdened by modern teacher observation systems (see Chapter 2). However, I have 
interacted with some Tennessee school and district leaders who value the teacher performance 
information gained from classroom observations. It seems these leaders place special value on 
this information for personnel decision-making (e.g. teacher retention). Therefore, I am not 
proposing school administrators never visit classrooms. School administrators could continue 
visiting classrooms for summative teacher evaluation. At the same time, observers with content 
expertise, shared by multiple districts, can conduct classroom observations for formative teacher 
evaluation. 
 The second policy implication concerns the demands on school administrator time, and 
potential brevity of observation cycles. Currently, teachers assigned to the highest (lowest) 
category of effectiveness are assigned one (four) observation(s) per year. Teachers assigned to 
the middle categories of effectiveness (i.e. LOE2 – LOE4) are assigned two or four observations. 
Policies could change so school administrators spend more or the same time with less effective 
teachers, and less time with more effective teachers, potentially reducing the total number of 
observations conducted. For example, teachers assigned the highest category of effectiveness 
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could be observed once over two years, and all teachers in the middle categories of effectiveness 
could be assigned two observations. These new schedules would address two problems described 
in the previous section. A reduction in the total number of observations school administrators 
conduct each year means a single observation can last more than 15 minutes, and administrators 
can devote more time to each post-observation conferences.  
 Policymakers may be able to improve the importance of post-observation feedback with a 
minor change to observation policy: remove the requirement all observations must identify an 
area of weakness. This requirement may be in place so reticent school administrators can blame 
state policy when identifying a teacher’s area of weakness. The Tennessee Board of Education 
can still provide cover for these administrators by requiring observers to identify an area of 
improvement for the least effective teachers. Or, observers could be expected to identify a single 
area of weakness after multiple observations.  
 Adopting any of the proposed policy solutions in this section may improve teacher 
performance. However, the second proposition may be the least controversial: shift observer foci 
to those teachers needing the most assistance. To the extent more observations worsen teacher 
performance or leave it unchanged, reducing the number of observations received by more 
effective teachers should do no harm. It is also plausible that the performance of less effective 
teachers could improve if observers can devote more time to each observation cycle. While this 
dissertation does not offer a clear solution, it does identify a clear problem: teacher classroom 
observations are not working as intended.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Predictive Margins of Quitting with 95% CIs 
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Table 1: Distribution of Observations by Certification and Prior LOE 
 
 Prior LOE 1 Prior LOE 2 – 4 Prior LOE 5 
 Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Apprentice 
Teachers       
Classroom Visits       
1 3 1.55 409 3.16 2167 63.59 
2 9 4.66 1840 14.20 625 18.34 
3 11 5.70 1089 8.40 263 7.72 
4 140 72.54 8241 63.58 276 8.10 
5 or more 30 15.54 1383 10.67 77 2.26 
       
Professional 
Teachers       
Classroom Visits       
1 4 1.22 2906 4.74 25264 68.90 
2 25 7.62 43643 71.15 8382 22.86 
3 18 5.49 4067 6.63 2265 6.18 
4 229 69.82 9516 15.51 697 1.90 
5 or more 52 15.85 1209 1.97 57 0.16 
Note: Percentages represent the percentage of all Tennessee teachers with a certain certification status and LOE (e.g. 
72.54% of Apprentice teachers with a prior LOE1 received four classroom visits) receiving a given number of 
observations per year. The percentages within each bold box total to 100. Bold cells indicate the minimum number 
of policy-assigned classroom visits a teacher should receive.   
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics. DV= TVAAS 
 
TVAAS Score 1.51 (7.46) 
   
TEAM Score 4.03 (0.51) 
   
Female 0.83 . 
BA+ 0.59 . 
Years Experience 12.18 (9.01) 
Black_White 0.05 . 
   
% Sample from Teachers Surrounding LOE 200 7.27%  
   
% Sample from Apprentice Teachers 13.8%  
Note: Sample descriptive statistics use data from the analytical sample associated with the largest bandwidth of 
40. Standard deviations in parentheses. BA+ is an indicator signaling if teacher has earned more than a BA/ BS 
degree. Black_White is an indicator signaling if teacher is black instead of white. Nearly all TN teachers are 
black or white.  
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Table 3: Sample Descriptive Statistics. DV=TLM Math and RLA Teachers 
 
 Math Mean Math SD RLA Mean RLA SD 
TLM Math Scores 0.02 (0.70) . . 
Annual Change in TLM 
Math Scores 0.10 (0.51) . . 
TLM RLA Scores . . 0.03 (0.67) 
Annual Change in TLM 
RLA Scores . . 0.10 (0.46) 
Female 0.83 (0.38) 0.90 (0.3) 
BA+ 0.57 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 
Years Experience 11.47 (8.69) 12.10 (9.07) 
Black_White 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.23) 
     
% Sample from Teachers 
Surrounding LOE 200 6.2 . 6.9 . 
% Sample from 
Apprentice Teachers 15.8 . 14.3 . 
     
Proportion of Students 
Taught with 
Characteristics 
    
Female 0.49 (0.12) 0.48 (0.13) 
Black 0.14 (0.19) 0.14 (0.19) 
White 0.77 (0.24) 0.77 (0.24) 
Asian 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 
Hispanic 0.07 (0.1) 0.07 (0.1) 
FRPL 0.56 (0.25) 0.54 (0.25) 
ESL 0.08 (0.12) 0.07 (0.13) 
Immigrant 0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06) 
Note: Sample descriptive statistics use data from the analytical sample associated with the largest bandwidth of 40. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. An annual change in teacher level mean scores uses achievement data linked to 
students taught by a teacher in year t: it is the difference in teacher level mean scores received by these students in 
year t and the scores these students received in year t – 1. BA+ is an indicator signaling if teacher has earned more 
than a BA/ BS degree. Black_White is an indicator signaling if teacher is black instead of white. Nearly all TN 
teachers are black or white. Proportions convey the proportion of students a teacher taught with a given 
characteristic.   
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Table 4: Covariate Balance Tests at LOE 200 Threshold. DV= TVAAS 
 
Covariate w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Experience: App 1.83 1.21 0.78 
 [1.292] [1.157] [1.161] 
Experience: Prof 0.33 0.43 0.23 
 [1.929] [1.623] [1.459] 
Female: App -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 
 [0.133] [0.110] [0.097] 
Female: Prof  -0.06 -0.11 -0.15 
 [0.109] [0.091] [0.083] 
BA+: App -0.06 -0.19 -0.18* 
 [0.119] [0.099] [0.089] 
BA+: Prof 0.13 0.04 0.06 
 [0.103] [0.087] [0.080] 
Black: App 0.07 0.07 0.05 
 [0.084] [0.072] [0.068] 
Black: Prof -0.05 0.02 0.01 
 [0.082] [0.068] [0.064] 
Lag TVAAS: App -3.43 -1.52 -1.53 
 [2.849] [2.519] [2.068] 
Lag TVAAS: Prof 0.88 -0.47 -0.20 
 [1.954] [1.667] [1.556] 
Lag TEAM: App 0.02 0.04 0.04 
 [0.060] [0.050] [0.044] 
Lag TEAM: Prof 0.02 > -0.01 -0.04 
 [0.073] [0.059] [0.055] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 602 972 1507 
Note: Estimates represent the total predicted change in the outcome. Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the 
teacher level. OLS estimator employed to estimate all coefficients. BA+ is a binary variable indicating if a teacher 
reported having a degree higher than a BA/ BS. Black is an indicator signaling whether the teacher reported her 
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ethnicity/ race as Black or White. Lagged TVAAS not included in any model, but balance is still checked. Tests for 
balance of lagged TVAAS use samples of 533, 853, and 1307. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 5: Covariate Balance Tests at LOE 425 Threshold. DV= TVAAS 
 
Covariate w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Experience: App 0.22 0.15 -0.17 
 [0.304] [0.265] [0.214] 
Experience: Prof -0.37 0.35 0.75 
 [0.574] [0.477] [0.414] 
Female: App 0.05 0.06 0.02 
 [0.073] [0.058] [0.050] 
Female: Prof  < 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 [0.025] [0.020] [0.017] 
BA+: App 0.04 0.03 0.06 
 [0.085] [0.068] [0.058] 
BA+: Prof 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
 [0.033] [0.027] [0.023] 
Black: App -0.09* -0.08** -0.04 
 [0.036] [0.028] [0.025] 
Black: Prof -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.015] [0.012] [0.010] 
Lag TVAAS: App 1.15 -0.47 -0.64 
 [1.033] [0.837] [0.725] 
Lag TVAAS: Prof 0.18 0.20 0.31 
 [0.381] [0.305] [0.264] 
Lag TEAM: App 0.06 0.10* 0.07 
 [0.059] [0.048] [0.041] 
Lag TEAM: Prof -0.03 -0.01 0.02 
 [0.027] [0.023] [0.019] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 9412 14278 19224 
Note: Estimates represent the total predicted change in the outcome. Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the 
teacher level. OLS estimator employed to estimate all coefficients. BA+ is a binary variable indicating if a teacher 
reported having a degree higher than a BA/ BS. Black is an indicator signaling whether the teacher reported her 
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ethnicity/ race as Black or White. Lagged TVAAS not included in any model, but balance is still checked. Tests for 
balance of lagged TVAAS use samples of 6520, 10264, and 14135. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 6: Covariate Balance Tests at LOE 425 Threshold. DV=TLM Math and RLA Teachers 
 
 TLM Math  TLM RLA 
Covariate w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Experience: App -0.10 0.11 -0.02 0.41 0.62 -0.02 
 [0.501] [0.417] [0.341] [0.501] [0.467] [0.343] 
Experience: Prof -1.76* 0.01 0.75 -2.53** -0.46 0.06 
 [0.873] [0.715] [0.617] [0.961] [0.775] [0.657] 
Censored Exp: App -0.02 -0.04 -0.13 0.29 0.20 0.02 
 [0.277] [0.234] [0.207] [0.316] [0.268] [0.232] 
Censored Exp: Prof -0.33 0.07 0.17 -0.21 0.13 0.25 
 [0.258] [0.211] [0.181] [0.252] [0.203] [0.175] 
Female: App 0.20* 0.19* 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 [0.095] [0.080] [0.069] [0.085] [0.075] [0.064] 
Female: Prof  -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
 [0.042] [0.034] [0.029] [0.031] [0.025] [0.022] 
BA+: App -0.14 -0.09 -0.02 -0.12 -0.05 0.03 
 [0.117] [0.096] [0.083] [0.129] [0.105] [0.088] 
BA+: Prof 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 
 [0.051] [0.042] [0.036] [0.049] [0.040] [0.035] 
Black: App -0.10 -0.09 -0.01 -0.13* -0.05 -0.03 
 [0.060] [0.050] [0.044] [0.062] [0.056] [0.050] 
Black: Prof -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.025] [0.021] [0.018] [0.025] [0.020] [0.018] 
Prior TLM Student Score: 
App > -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.11 
 [0.230] [0.160] [0.134] [0.266] [0.194] [0.159] 
Prior TLM Student Score: 
Prof < 0.01 0.01 > -0.01 -0.03 < 0.01 0.02 
 [0.083] [0.067] [0.056] [0.073] [0.058] [0.049] 
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Proportion of Students Taught 
with Characteristics  
   
  
Female: App 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
 [0.040] [0.031] [0.026] [0.045] [0.034] [0.029] 
Female: Prof -0.02 > -0.01 > -0.01 -0.01 > -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.013] [0.011] [0.009] [0.015] [0.012] [0.010] 
Black: App > -0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
Black: Prof < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 > -0.01 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
White: App > -0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
White: Prof < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 > -0.01 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Asian: App < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
Asian: Prof < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 > -0.01 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Hispanic: App > -0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
Hispanic: Prof < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
FRPL: App 0.12* 0.08* 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.05 
 [0.051] [0.041] [0.035] [0.061] [0.047] [0.038] 
FRPL: Prof 0.02 0.01 > -0.01 0.02 0.01 > -0.01 
 [0.021] [0.017] [0.015] [0.020] [0.016] [0.013] 
ESL: App -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.028] [0.021] [0.016] [0.016] [0.013] [0.011] 
ESL: Prof -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
 [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] 
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Immigrant: App 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.019] [0.015] [0.012] [0.021] [0.018] [0.015] 
Immigrant: Prof < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
N(Tch-Yrs) 3348 5205 7197 3143 4906 6783 
Note: Estimates represent the total predicted change in the outcome. Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors 
clustered at the teacher level. OLS estimator employed to estimate all coefficients. BA+ is a binary variable 
indicating if a teacher reported having a degree higher than a BA/ BS. Black is an indicator signaling whether the 
teacher reported her ethnicity/ race as Black or White. Censored experience is years of experience censored after ten 
years. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 7: Sample Descriptive Statistics. DV = Survey Items 
 
 Mean SD 
Sum: Svy Hrs in PD (PDhrs) 2.56 [17.46] 
Sum: Svy Tch Collab (tchcollab) 11.91 [41.10] 
Sum: Svy Exerted More Effort (effortsum) 0.31 [1.54] 
Svy Hrs Improved Instruction (insthrs) 37.27 [33.74] 
Sum: Svy Hrs Prepped for Obs (obshrs) 2.25 [1.30] 
Eval Will Improve Teaching (imprvtch) 0.59 [0.492] 
Post-Obs FB is Useful (fbuseful) 0.87 [0.336] 
Evals Change My Teaching (chngtch) 0.72 [0.449] 
Observer Qualified (obsqual) 0.78 [0.413] 
Evaluations Are Fair (faireval) 0.64 [0.480] 
Note: Sample descriptive statistics use data from samples associated with the largest bandwidth of 40. 
Standard deviations in brackets, number of teacher-year records in bandwidths of 40 in parentheses. See 
Appendix E to read about the original survey items and scales these variables are based on and how I created 
these variables.  
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Table 8: Tests of Joint Significance Concerning the Impetus to Improve 
 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Sum: Svy Hrs in PD 
(PDhrs) 
  
1.59 1.55 1.46 
[0.175] [0.185] [0.211] 
(2350) (3601) (4664) 
Sum: Svy Tch 
Collab (tchcollab) 
  
5.79*** 1.12 1.82 
[< 0.001] [0.343] [0.122] 
(1048) (1607) (2109) 
Sum: Svy Exerted 
More Effort 
(effortsum) 
  
3.57** 1.87 0.59 
[0.007] [0.112] [0.671] 
(1427) (2183) (2802) 
Sum: Svy Hrs 
Improved 
Instruction (insthrs) 
  
0.20 0.45 0.44 
[0.940] [0.776] [0.782] 
(3701) (5740) (7555) 
Sum: Svy Hrs 
Prepped for Obs 
(obshrs) 
0.82 3.22* 2.37 
[0.511] [0.012] [0.051] 
(8480) (12958) (16604) 
Note: p-values in brackets, number of teacher-year records in sample in parentheses. All models include teacher 
demographics, certification status, controls for the distribution of teacher effectiveness at the school level, second 
order polynomial of LOE interacted with teacher certification status, and year fixed effects. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 
0.01), *** (p < 0.001)  
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 Table 9: Impetus to Improve: Testing Joint Significance of 425-Threshold Instruments  
 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Sum: Svy Hrs in PD 
(PDhrs) 
  
0.13 1.08 0.72 
[0.879] [0.339] [0.487] 
(1698) (2526) (3318) 
Sum: Svy Tch 
Collab (tchcollab) 
 
1.57 0.85 1.12 
[0.208] [0.429] [0.326] 
(709) (1087) (1439) 
Sum: Svy Exerted 
More Effort 
(effortsum) 
0.92 0.12 < 0.01 
[0.399] [0.886] [0.999] 
(1084) (1589) (2046) 
Sum: Svy Hrs 
Improved 
Instruction (insthrs) 
  
0.13 0.18 0.64 
[0.881] [0.831] [0.526] 
(2721) (4181) (5591) 
Sum: Svy Hrs 
Prepped for Obs 
(obshrs) 
0.89 0.76 0.21 
[0.410] [0.466] [0.814] 
(6417) (9417) (12174) 
Note: Ibid.  
  
  
 
81 
Table 10: Tests of Joint Significance Concerning Reinforcing Perceptions 
 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Evals Improve 
Teaching (imprvtch) 1.20 0.59 0.45 
 [0.302] [0.552] [0.640] 
 (12227) (18676) (24069) 
Post-Observation 
Feedback is Useful 
(fbuseful) 
0.23 1.31 0.17 
 [0.792] [0.270] [0.845] 
 (7796) (12000) (15745) 
Changed Teaching 
Due to Evals (chngtch) 0.11 0.64 0.43 
 [0.897] [0.529] [0.650] 
 (3239) (4986) (6530) 
Observers are 
Qualified (obsqual) 0.33 0.56 0.19 
 [0.722] [0.570] [0.826] 
 (7730) (11768) (14957) 
Evaluations are Fair 
(faireval) 1.05 0.58 0.89 
 [0.350] [0.562] [0.410] 
 (7735) (11772) (14970) 
Note: p-values in brackets, number of teacher-year records in sample in parentheses. All models include teacher 
demographics, certification status, controls for the distribution of teacher effectiveness at the school level, second 
order polynomial of LOE interacted with teacher certification status, and year fixed effects.  
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Table 11: Pooled and 425-Only Local RDD. DV=TVAAS 
 
 Pooled RDD 425-Prof RDD 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
2nd Stage: Number of 
Observations  -0.77 -0.05 0.10 0.02 0.42 0.67 
 [0.623] [0.543] [0.444] [0.941] [0.724] [0.587] 
1st Stage:       
App Below LOE 200 1.31*** 1.32*** 1.59*** . . . 
 [0.318] [0.281] [0.299] . . . 
Prof Below LOE 200 1.76*** 1.85*** 1.80*** . . . 
 [0.226] [0.171] [0.152] . . . 
App Below LOE 425 0.86*** 0.94*** 0.89*** . . . 
 [0.258] [0.203] [0.171] . . . 
Prof Below LOE 425 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.62*** 0.48*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 
 [0.070] [0.057] [0.049] [0.054] [0.044] [0.038] 
Prof -0.28 -0.24 -0.24* . . . 
 [0.166] [0.131] [0.109] . . . 
Intercept 3.12*** 3.03*** 2.95*** 2.75*** 2.77*** 2.73*** 
 [0.287] [0.229] [0.197] [0.212] [0.174] [0.149] 
N(Teachers-Year) 7053 11117 15622 8150 12489 16936 
Note: Ibid. Each 1st stage estimate represents the total effect of crossing a threshold for each teacher group, none of 
the 1st stage estimate are interactions. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001) 
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Table 12: Pooled Local RDD Main Results. DV=TLM Math and RLA Teachers 
 
 TLM Math TLM RLA 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
2nd Stage: Number of 
Observations  -0.11* -0.10* -0.08* -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 
 [0.049] [0.042] [0.035] [0.043] [0.032] [0.029] 
1st Stage:       
App Below LOE 200 1.26 1.15 1.70*** 1.34*** 1.01*** 1.08*** 
 [0.679] [0.0595] [0.486] [0.285] [0.227] [0.197] 
Prof Below LOE 200 2.28*** 2.27*** 2.17*** 2.06*** 2.57*** 2.63*** 
 [0.257] [0.197] [0.201] [0.473] [0.454] [0.457] 
App Below LOE 425 1.31*** 1.30*** 1.16*** 0.97* 1.28*** 1.17*** 
 [0.360] [0.279] [0.239] [0.394] [0.302] [0.259] 
Prof Below LOE 425 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.57*** 0.61*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 
 [0.101] [0.081] [0.071] [0.101] [0.080] [0.068] 
Prof -0.28 -0.15 -0.17 -0.24 -0.24 -0.15 
 [0.219] [0.175] [0.149] [0.296] [0.233] [0.202] 
Intercept 4.31*** 4.33*** 3.79*** 2.67** 2.73*** 2.79*** 
 [0.920] [0.081] [0.714] [0.973] [0.564] [0.546] 
N(Teachers-Year) 3348 5205 7197 3143 4906 6783 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors in brackets. All models include a polynomial of the teacher-level mean 
of prior achievement scores for students taught in year t (e.g. the 2011-12 scores of students taught in 2012-13), 
proportion of students taught holding various characteristics, teacher demographics including certification 
status, controls for the distribution of teacher effectiveness at the school level, a second order polynomial of 
pooled LOE interacted with teacher certification status, and year fixed effects. Each 1st stage estimate 
represents the total effect of crossing a threshold for each teacher group, none of the 1st stage estimate are 
interactions. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001) 
  
  
 
84 
Table 13: Effects by Thresholds. DV=TLM Math or RLA 
 
 TLM Math TLM RLA 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
 Teachers Surrounding LOE 425 Only 
2nd Stage: Number of 
Observations  -0.13 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 
 [0.088] [0.079] [0.067] [0.083] [0.055] [0.048] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 3175 4909 6746 2975 4625 6315 
 Professional Teachers Surrounding LOE 425 Only 
2nd Stage: Number of 
Observations  -0.29 -0.17 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 
 [0.160] [0.118] [0.085] [0.082] [0.060] [0.052] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 2662 4187 5814 2558 4025 5539 
Note: Ibid.  
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Table 14: Extended Effects of Observations 
 
 TVAAS TLM Math Scores TLM RLA Scores 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
2nd Stage: 
Number of 
Lagged 
Observations 
-0.83 -1.01 -0.20 0.03 -0.15 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 
[0.979] [0.789] [0.754] [0.139] [0.115] [0.091] [0.093] [0.069] [0.055] 
N(Tch-Yrs) 3875 5831 7686 2136 3228 4386 1989 3004 4059 
 425-Professional Sample 
2nd Stage: 
Number of 
Lagged 
Observations 
0.38 -0.05 0.76 -0.03 -0.18 -0.09 -0.18 -0.10 -0.12 
[2.066] [1.522] [1.256] [0.144] [0.117] [0.092] [0.130] [0.095] [0.078] 
N(Tch-Yrs) 3332 5067 6715 1789 2734 3752 1711 2621 3564 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors in brackets. Bottom panel estimates based only on Professional teacher at 425 threshold. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** 
(p < 0.001) 
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Table 15: Cumulative Effects of Observations 
 
 TVAAS TLM Math TLM RLA 
2nd Stage: 
Cumulative 
Number of 
Observations 
-1.53*** -0.02*** -0.01* 
 [0.045] [0.005] [0.004] 
1st Stage: 
Cumulative 
Number of 
Policy-
Assigned 
Observations 
0.49*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 
 [0.015] [0.025] [0.021] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 46412 13210 14204 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors in brackets. Estimates produced by fuzzy full-sample RDDs using same 
controls as previous models. The predictor and instrument are, respectively, the total number of observations 
received and assigned through year t beginning in 2012-13. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001) 
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Table 16: Robustness Tests Concerning Loss of LOE5 
 
 TVAAS  TLM Math  TLM RLA  
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
2nd Stage: 
Number of 
Observations 
-0.29 0.16 1.09 -0.19 -0.03 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 
 [1.113] [0.913] [0.778] [0.242] [0.177] [0.105] [0.120] [0.079] [0.065] 
2nd Stage: 
From LOE 5 
to 4 
Interaction 
0.80 0.28 0.82 -0.20 0.21 0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 
 [1.472] [1.184] [1.135] [0.528] [0.435] [0.383] [0.136] [0.123] [0.112] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 4037 6453 9138 1563 2506 3590 1506 2431 3401 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors in brackets. Models include previously discussed controls. The instruments 
are crossing the 425 threshold for Apprentice and Professional teachers, and the interaction between these 
instruments and a dummy variable indicating if a teacher with an LOE of 4 in year t – 1 had an LOE of 5 in year t – 
2. The second row of coefficients are interactions, not main effects. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)  
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Table 17: Effects of Crossing LOE at Other Thresholds 
 
 
TVAAS TLM Math  TLM RLA  
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Crossing 
Prior 275 
LOE 
Threshold 
0.29 0.43 0.78 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 
[0.626] [0.523] [0.437] [0.046] [0.038] [0.033] [0.032] [0.027] [0.024] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 5166 7745 10196 1415 2099 2748 1796 2756 3680 
Crossing 
Prior 350 
LOE 
Threshold 
0.19 -0.02 -0.09 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 < 0.01 > -0.01 
[0.393] [0.327] [0.286] [0.034] [0.029] [0.025] [0.020] [0.017] [0.015] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 8646 12835 16896 2307 3438 4556 3729 5509 7191 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors in brackets. Models include previously discussed controls, but the predictor of interest is crossing the LOE-cont 275 and 
350 thresholds. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001) 
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Table 18: Heterogenous Effects by Grade Level 
 
 TVAAS TLM Math TLM RLA 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
K-5 -1.61* -1.28** -0.73 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 
 [-2.85,-0.38] [-2.21,-0.34] [-1.48,0.02] [-0.16,0.01] [-0.14,0.01] [-0.10,0.03] [-0.15,0.01] [-0.10,0.02] [-0.10,0.00] 
5-8 -1.52* -1.23* -0.77 -0.06 -0.09* -0.09* -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
 [-2.90,-0.14] [-2.27,-0.19] [-1.57,0.02] [-0.15,0.03] [-0.18,-0.01] [-0.16,-0.02] [-0.11,0.06] [-0.08,0.05] [-0.08,0.03] 
9-12 -6.43*** -6.14*** -5.23*** -0.09* -0.12** -0.08* -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
 [-8.47,-4.39] [-7.66,-4.62] [-6.41,-4.05] [-0.17,-0.00] [-0.20,-0.04] [-0.15,-0.01] [-0.13,0.03] [-0.11,0.02] [-0.10,0.01] 
K-8 -1.10 -0.63 -0.26 -0.16* -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
 [-2.33,0.13] [-1.52,0.26] [-1.00,0.48] [-0.31,-0.01] [-0.21,0.01] [-0.16,0.02] [-0.13,0.05] [-0.08,0.06] [-0.07,0.05] 
K-12 -1.58 -2.83* -1.46* 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.11 0.06 0.02 
 [-4.20,1.04] [-5.10,-0.56] [-2.80,-0.12] [-0.12,0.15] [-0.17,0.10] [-0.15,0.06] [-0.16,0.39] [-0.17,0.29] [-0.05,0.09] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 7053 11117 15622 3348 5205 7197 3143 4906 6783 
Note: Standard errors clustered at teacher level. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Models use previously discussed controls. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** 
(p < 0.001) 
  
  
 
90 
Table 19: Heterogeneous Effects by Teacher Experience 
 
 TVAAS TLM Math TLM RLA 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
YrsExp [0, 5) -2.52** -2.47*** -2.19*** -0.13** -0.09* -0.07* -0.05 -0.04 -0.06* 
 [-4.02,-1.01] [-3.74,-1.20] [-3.25,-1.13] [-0.21,-0.04] [-0.16,-0.01] [-0.13,-0.00] [-0.13,0.03] [-0.10,0.02] [-0.11,-0.00] 
YrsExp [5, 10) -3.17** -2.84*** -2.39*** -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
 [-5.22,-1.12] [-4.47,-1.20] [-3.67,-1.11] [-0.15,0.03] [-0.10,0.06] [-0.11,0.03] [-0.13,0.03] [-0.10,0.02] [-0.11,-0.00] 
YrsExp [10, .) -3.28*** -3.00*** -2.35*** -0.10* -0.08* -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 
 [-5.08,-1.49] [-4.32,-1.67] [-3.47,-1.23] [-0.19,-0.00] [-0.17,-0.00] [-0.15,0.01] [-0.18,0.01] [-0.12,0.02] [-0.11,0.01] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 7053 11117 15622 3348 5205 7197 3143 4906 6783 
Note: Ibid.   
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Table 20: Heterogenous Effects by Administrator Effectiveness 
 
 TVAAS TLM Math TLM RLA 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
 School-Level Distribution of Admin LOE 
1st Qrt -3.60*** -3.33*** -2.98*** -0.09 -0.10* -0.08 -0.07* -0.05 -0.04 
 [-5.37,-1.84] [-4.96,-1.69] [-4.35,-1.62] [-0.20,0.02] [-0.19,-0.00] [-0.17,0.00] [-0.14,-0.01] [-0.11,0.01] [-0.09,0.02] 
2nd Qrt -3.08*** -2.67*** -2.26*** -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 
 [-4.76,-1.40] [-3.94,-1.41] [-3.34,-1.19] [-0.15,0.02] [-0.14,0.02] [-0.14,0.01] [-0.13,0.07] [-0.10,0.04] [-0.12,0.01] 
3rd Qrt -2.72** -2.53*** -2.33*** -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 [-4.40,-1.04] [-3.93,-1.12] [-3.49,-1.17] [-0.16,0.02] [-0.15,0.02] [-0.13,0.01] [-0.10,0.07] [-0.08,0.05] [-0.08,0.04] 
4th Qrt -2.47** -2.42*** -2.06*** -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 
 [-4.07,-0.88] [-3.80,-1.04] [-3.17,-0.94] [-0.13,0.07] [-0.11,0.07] [-0.10,0.04] [-0.09,0.08] [-0.09,0.04] [-0.10,0.02] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 6968 10972 15390 3298 5125 7073 3100 4834 6676 
 School-Level Distribution of Admin TEAM Scores 
1st Qrt -3.46*** -2.97*** -2.48*** -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
 [-5.14,-1.79] [-4.37,-1.58] [-3.65,-1.31] [-0.15,0.01] [-0.14,0.00] [-0.12,0.01] [-0.11,0.04] [-0.09,0.03] [-0.10,0.01] 
2nd Qrt -2.99** -2.69*** -2.46*** -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
 [-4.79,-1.19] [-3.90,-1.49] [-3.53,-1.39] [-0.18,0.01] [-0.15,0.02] [-0.14,0.00] [-0.12,0.05] [-0.08,0.04] [-0.09,0.02] 
3rd Qrt -3.17*** -2.66*** -2.19*** -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 
 [-4.87,-1.48] [-4.00,-1.32] [-3.32,-1.06] [-0.16,0.03] [-0.16,0.02] [-0.14,0.01] [-0.09,0.07] [-0.08,0.05] [-0.11,0.01] 
4th Qrt -2.74** -2.38** -2.06*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 [-4.73,-0.75] [-3.87,-0.89] [-3.29,-0.84] [-0.13,0.06] [-0.11,0.05] [-0.09,0.05] [-0.11,0.08] [-0.09,0.05] [-0.09,0.05] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 6912 10881 15259 3265 5077 7008 3066 4782 6607 
Note: Ibid.   
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Table 21: Heterogenous Effects by Administrator Skills 
 
 TVAAS TLM Math TLM RLA 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
 School-Level Distribution of Admin Skills as Teacher Evaluator 
1st Qrt -3.55*** -2.90*** -2.26*** -0.11* -0.08 -0.05 -0.08* -0.06 -0.07* 
 [-5.27,-1.83] [-4.30,-1.50] [-3.42,-1.09] [-0.20,-0.02] [-0.16,0.01] [-0.12,0.02] [-0.16,-0.01] [-0.12,0.00] [-0.13,-0.02] 
2nd Qrt -2.56** -2.16** -1.78** -0.12* -0.10* -0.09** -0.06 -0.05 -0.07* 
 [-4.13,-0.98] [-3.49,-0.83] [-2.91,-0.65] [-0.21,-0.03] [-0.18,-0.02] [-0.16,-0.03] [-0.14,0.02] [-0.12,0.02] [-0.14,-0.00] 
3rd Qrt -2.72** -2.43*** -1.76** -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
 [-4.44,-1.00] [-3.86,-0.99] [-2.93,-0.59] [-0.17,0.04] [-0.17,0.03] [-0.15,0.01] [-0.12,0.06] [-0.11,0.03] [-0.11,0.02] 
4th Qrt -2.89** -2.17** -1.64** -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 
 [-5.03,-0.74] [-3.59,-0.74] [-2.82,-0.47] [-0.17,0.02] [-0.14,0.03] [-0.12,0.03] [-0.12,0.05] [-0.12,0.02] [-0.12,0.01] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 6299 9948 14028 2973 4629 6412 2798 4373 6060 
 School-Level Distribution of Admin Skills as Supporter of Teacher Professional Learning 
1st Qrt -2.81*** -2.51*** -2.18*** -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10** -0.07* -0.08** 
 [-4.36,-1.26] [-3.81,-1.20] [-3.30,-1.05] [-0.17,0.00] [-0.14,0.00] [-0.12,0.01] [-0.17,-0.02] [-0.13,-0.00] [-0.14,-0.02] 
2nd Qrt -3.90*** -3.24*** -2.56*** -0.08 -0.09* -0.07* -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 
 [-5.82,-1.98] [-4.79,-1.70] [-3.88,-1.25] [-0.17,0.01] [-0.17,-0.01] [-0.14,-0.00] [-0.13,0.02] [-0.10,0.03] [-0.12,0.01] 
3rd Qrt -3.09** -2.40*** -2.03*** -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07* 
 [-4.98,-1.21] [-3.63,-1.16] [-3.11,-0.94] [-0.19,0.02] [-0.16,0.01] [-0.13,0.01] [-0.15,0.01] [-0.13,0.01] [-0.13,-0.01] 
4th Qrt -3.37** -2.63** -2.21** -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
 [-5.58,-1.16] [-4.24,-1.02] [-3.54,-0.89] [-0.17,0.03] [-0.14,0.02] [-0.13,0.02] [-0.13,0.05] [-0.11,0.04] [-0.12,0.02] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 6360 10041 14159 2994 4663 6459 2816 4402 6100 
Note: Ibid.   
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Table 22: Full-Sample RDD. Short-Term and Extended Effects 
 
 TVAAS  TLM Math  TLM RLA  TVAAS  TLM Math  TLM RLA  
 Contemporaneous Effects Extended Effects 
2nd Stage: 
Number of 
Observations 
-1.54*** -0.10*** -0.04* -0.48* -0.08** < 0.01 
 [0.212] [0.022] [0.017] [0.232] [0.024] [0.019] 
1st Stage: 
Number of 
Assigned 
Policy-
Assigned 
Observations  
0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 
 [0.015] [0.026] [0.025] [0.018] [0.031] [0.028] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 46412 15311 16470 24661 8976 9604 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors in brackets. Models include previously discussed controls. The instrument is 
the minimum number of policy-assigned observations assigned to a teacher based on their lagged LOE and 
certification status. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001) 
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B. Tennessee Educator Acceleration Model Observation Rubrics 
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C.  Relationships Between Observations and TEAM Scores 
 
 
Conventional wisdom and the TEAM theory of action implies more observations should 
improve observational scores (i.e. TEAM scores). However, TEAM scores are susceptible to a 
source of bias that cannot affect student achievement: observer bias. There are at least two 
reasons why observers may generate biased scores. First, observers have an incentive to show 
that teachers exhibit large within-year growth ( “strategic rating”). Most observers are school 
administrators, and Tennessee school administrators receive their own observational ratings from 
an administration supervisor (Tennessee Board of Education, 2013). School administrator 
observational ratings are based in part on the performance of their teachers, and teacher TEAM 
scores are the portion of teacher performance a school administrator can directly control. Thus, 
school administrators may take advantage of this system and strategically rate teachers assigned 
more observations lower on the first observation, only to rate them higher on later observations. 
Doing so would suggest teachers experience within-year “growth.” Second, observers almost 
certainly know teachers assigned more observations have relatively lower LOE. Observers may 
rate teachers in such a way that confirms an un/ conscious impression: teachers in lower LOE are 
worse teachers and their observational ratings should reflect this. In this section I explore these 
sources of observer bias and present evidence that observer bias is present.  
Tests presented in this appendix use teachers of tested and untested subjects, whereas 
analyses in the body of the dissertation almost always use the former. In the event unobserved 
heterogeneity exists across teachers of tested and untested subjects, I check the balance of 
covariates in this new sample using equation 7. Tables 23 and 24 show no evidence of 
imbalanced covariates at either threshold. 
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Table 25 displays estimates produced by equations 1 and 2 when the outcome is TEAM 
scores. The association between observations and TEAM scores is approximately one-quarter of 
the standard deviation of the annual change in TEAM scores (i.e. -0.11 units on the TEAM 
scale). A teacher’s lagged TEAM score is a right-hand side variable in all models in this 
appendix. Table 26 shows the relationship between observations and TEAM scores separated by 
threshold resemble the results in Table 25.  
I test for observer bias by examining scores assigned during the first occasion that an 
observer evaluated a teacher. The question is whether this score is influenced by the number of 
times the teacher is supposed to be observed. It is important to point out that any such influence 
on the first score received cannot be a genuine treatment effect. The first observation score 
cannot be influenced by treatment effects because the teacher has not had time to respond to the 
first observation. Instead, these estimates pick up the effect of a teacher’s assignment to receive 
more observations—i.e., they indicate that the instrument influences the outcome other than 
through the observations.  
  To explore observer bias I modify equations 1 and 2. First, I replace the outcome in 
equation 1 with the first observational rating a teacher receives in a school year. I also add two 
controls to equations 1 and 2: the month of the first observation and the domains rated on the 
first observation. It is plausible that the month during which a teacher receives her first 
observation is correlated with her performance (e.g. observers may want to postpone difficult 
observations). It may also be the case that observers tend to rate teachers in one domain more 
harshly than another. I also estimate some effects using a sample restricted to teachers receiving 
more than one observation. It may be unwise to compare the “first” observation received by a 
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teacher whose first observation is her only observation, to teachers who receive more than one 
observation. Thus, I drop teachers from some analytical samples if they receive one observation.  
There is clear evidence suggesting observer bias exists. The top-left panel of Table 27 
reprints estimates from Table 25, and the top-right panel of Table 27 uses equations 1 and 2 with 
the restricted sample. Estimates produced by the restricted sample resemble those produced by 
the unrestricted sample. The second panel of Table 27 shows the first rating generated for 
teachers receiving an additional observation is systematically lower than teachers assigned fewer 
observations. This is true in the unrestricted and restricted samples and strongly suggests rater 
bias is present.  
As mentioned in the beginning of this appendix, there are at least two sources of observer 
bias: school administrator desire to strategically rate teachers so ratings exhibit large within-year 
growth, and the influence of LOE on rating behaviors. In the remainder of this appendix I 
explore whether evidence suggests these are indeed the sources of observer bias. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, these explorations are unnecessary. It is enough to know that 
TEAM scores should not be used as outcomes in my main analyses. However, identifying 
sources of observer bias is of interest in its own right. Evidence of either source would imply 
policy is biasing observation scores, something policymakers and practitioners would be eager to 
correct. 
I test for biased, strategic rating (e.g. low to high ratings) by observers in two ways. I 
estimate the relationship between an additional observation and two new outcomes: the last 
observation score received, and the difference between the first and summative observation 
score. If observers initially rate teachers assigned more observations lower, only to 
systematically rate them higher on subsequent observations, the last observation received by 
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teachers assigned more observations should be higher than teachers assigned fewer observations. 
The second new outcome measures the atypicality of a first score relative to the summative 
TEAM score. A large positive (negative) value of this atypicality measure would suggest the first 
score was atypically lower (higher) than the average observational score. If administrators 
engage in low-to-high scoring behavior, the atypicality measure of teachers assigned more 
observations will be higher than the atypicality measure of teachers assigned fewer observations. 
To test these two hypotheses, I replace the outcome in equation 1 with each of these two new 
outcomes (these models control for lagged summative TEAM score). When the outcome is the 
last observation score a teacher received, I also control for the month of the last observation and 
domains rated during this observation. Similarly, when the outcome is the atypicality measure I 
control for the month of the first observation and domains rated during that observation.  
The penultimate and bottom panels in Table 27 display results from these two tests using 
unrestricted and restricted samples (i.e. teachers receiving more than one observation). There is 
no evidence supporting my hypotheses that administrators engage in the low-to-high strategic 
rating behavior. The penultimate panel in Table 27 shows the association between the 
assignment of an additional observation and teacher’s last rating is approximately is nearly the 
same as that estimated when the outcome was the first rating, suggesting the relationship 
between observer bias and the first observational rating may persist. The final panel shows the 
assignment of an additional observation is not predictive of a more atypical first rating score.  
If observers consciously or unconsciously assume that teachers who received low LOE’s 
in the past should receive lower ratings again, I should observe that teachers just below the 275 
(350) lagged LOE-cont thresholds systematically receive a lower first observation score than 
teachers just above the threshold. Importantly, there are no policy-assigned discontinuities in the 
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observation schedule at these thresholds. The treatment of interest in this supplemental analysis 
is assignment to an adjacent, lower LOE. To assess the effect of assignment to a lower LOE I use 
the following model:  ("1)			&'()1*+,-. = 01,-. + 34ℎ(·) + 748,-. + 94:-. + ;. + <,-., >?@',-.> ≤ B 
Where &'()1*+,-.  is the first observational rating received by teacher i in school j in year t. ?@',-.  is now centered at values of 275 (350) and w is the bandwidth. 1,-.  is an indicator 
signaling if the teacher is below the 275 (350) threshold. All equation 1 and 2 controls are also in 
equation D1. But, equation D1 also includes a fixed effect for the domains rated on the first 
observation and fixed effect for the month of the first observation. 0 is the coefficient of interest. 
Equation D1 does not represent a pooled RDD, but two separate one-stage RDDs. In results not 
shown, all covariates in 8,-. balance at the 275 and 350 thresholds.  
 If assignment to a lower LOE negatively influences observer bias, results in Table 28 
should be negative. Instead, the effect of assignment to LOE2 instead of LOE3 on the first 
observation score is positive (see top panel), the opposite of what is expected if observer bias 
exists due to LOE assignment. As seen in the bottom panel of Table 28, there is also no evidence 
at the 375-threshold observer bias exists due to teacher LOE. If observer bias due to teacher 
assignment is not present at these two thresholds, it is unlikely the observer bias at the 200 and 
425 thresholds is a response to lower teacher LOE.  
 Robustness tests presented in this appendix suggest observer bias is not a direct response 
to teacher lagged LOE per se. Furthermore, covariate balance tests presented in Tables 23 and 24 
show teachers on either side of the 200 or 425 thresholds are similar with respect to time-
invariant and pre-treatment characteristics. If teachers on either side of these thresholds appear 
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similar, and the most obvious difference between teachers on either side of these thresholds (i.e. 
different lagged LOE) does not account for observer bias, would could drive this source of bias?  
 Teachers on either side of the 200 or 425 thresholds differ in one more way: TDOE 
assigns teachers below these thresholds more observations than teachers above these thresholds. 
It may be the case that the TDOE assignment of observations is the driver of observer bias. 
Observers know that teachers just below these thresholds should receive more observations, and 
this information may un/ consciously lead observers to decide that teachers below the threshold 
deserve lower scores. This explanation is speculative, but evidence presented thus far supports 
this proposition.  
 There may be other explanations that can account for the relationships discussed in this 
appendix. A thorough investigation of the sources of observer bias are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but such work would almost certainly be of interest to practitioners. By pinpointing 
the sources of bias, practitioners may be able to develop policies/ interventions that can mitigate 
the problem.  
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Table 23: Covariate Balance Tests at LOE 200 Threshold. DV= TEAM 
 
Covariate w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Experience: App 0.46 0.19 0.05 
 [0.832] [0.785] [0.769] 
Experience: Prof -1.16 -0.63 -0.55 
 [1.237] [1.028] [0.941] 
Female: App -0.16 -0.14 -0.11 
 [0.094] [0.080] [0.072] 
Female: Prof  0.01 -0.01 > -0.01 
 [0.068] [0.057] [0.051] 
BA+: App -0.02 -0.14 -0.10 
 [0.092] [0.078] [0.071] 
BA+: Prof 0.05 0.06 0.06 
 [0.069] [0.057] [0.052] 
Black: App 0.10 0.12 0.09 
 [0.069] [0.060] [0.056] 
Black: Prof -0.03 -0.02 0.01 
 [0.057] [0.047] [0.043] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 1322 2181 3384 
Note: Estimates represent the total predicted change in the outcome. None of these estimates are interactions. 
Standard errors, clustered at teacher level, in brackets. Records are included in these covariate balance checks if 
used in models where the outcome is TEAM scores. OLS estimator employed to estimate all coefficients. BA+ is a 
binary variable indicating if a teacher reported having a degree higher than a BA/ BS. Black is an indicator signaling 
whether the teacher reported her ethnicity/ race as Black or White.  
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Table 24: Covariate Balance Tests at LOE 425 Threshold. DV=TEAM 
 
Covariate w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Experience: App 0.13 0.12 0.03 
 [0.297] [0.228] [0.192] 
Experience: Prof -0.02 0.09 0.21 
 [0.357] [0.295] [0.257] 
Female: App -0.01 0.01 > -0.01 
 [0.046] [0.037] [0.033] 
Female: Prof  0.02 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.016] [0.013] [0.012] 
BA+: App -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 
 [0.051] [0.042] [0.036] 
BA+: Prof 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 [0.020] [0.016] [0.014] 
Black: App -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
 [0.021] [0.018] [0.016] 
Black: Prof > -0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.006] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 24872 36731 47817 
Note: Ibid.   
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Table 25: Local RDD. DV=TEAM 
 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
2nd Stage: Number 
of Observations  -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10*** 
 [0.017] [0.014] [0.012] 
1st Stage:    
App Below LOE 
200 0.86*** 0.81*** 1.00*** 
 [0.243] [0.120] [0.210] 
Prof Below LOE 
200 1.89*** 1.91*** 1.88*** 
 [0.152] [0.131] [0.121] 
App Below LOE 
425 1.26*** 1.26*** 1.36*** 
 [0.138] [0.111] [0.095] 
Prof Below LOE 
425 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 
 [0.034] [0.027] [0.023] 
Prof -0.50*** -0.45*** -0.34*** 
 [0.102] [0.083] [0.071] 
Intercept 3.08*** 2.94*** 2.69*** 
 [0.175] [0.143] [0.124] 
N(Tch-Yrs) 26194 38912 51201 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors are in brackets. All models include the one-year lag of the outcome, teacher 
demographics including certification status, controls for the distribution of teacher effectiveness at the school level, 
a second order polynomial of pooled LOE interacted with teacher certification status, and year fixed effects. Each 1st 
stage estimate represents the total effect of crossing a threshold for each teacher group, none of the 1st stage estimate 
are interactions. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)  
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Table 26: Effects by Thresholds. DV=TEAM 
 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
 Teachers Surrounding LOE 425 Only 
2nd Stage: Number 
of Observations  -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 
 [0.022] [0.018] [0.015] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 24872 36731 47817 
 Teachers Surrounding LOE 200 Only 
2nd Stage: Number 
of Observations  -0.14 -0.04 -0.08 
 [0.117] [0.105] [0.092] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 1322 2181 3384 
Note: Ibid. 
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Table 27: Exploring Rater Bias. DV=First or Last TEAM Ratings Received 
 
 
w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
 
Any Number of Obs Observations Received > 1 
2nd Stage: 
Number of 
Observations 
DV = TEAM Score 
-0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.16** -0.15*** -0.13*** 
[0.017] [0.014] [0.012] [0.058] [0.044] [0.037] 
DV = 1st Rating 
-0.14*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.24** -0.22*** -0.19*** 
[0.035] [0.029] [0.023] [0.077] [0.059] [0.047] 
DV = Last Rating 
-0.15*** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.25** -0.26*** -0.22*** 
[0.038] [0.031] [0.025] [0.083] [0.064] [0.053] 
DV = 1st Rating – TEAM Score 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
[0.020] [0.017] [0.013] [0.044] [0.035] [0.028] 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors are in brackets. All models include the one-year lag of the TEAM score, 
teacher demographics including certification status, controls for the distribution of teacher effectiveness at the 
school level, a second order polynomial of pooled LOE interacted with teacher certification status, and year fixed 
effects. Last three models restricted to teachers receiving more than one classroom visit. Last two models control for 
month of the first or last observation and the domains rated during that observation. These models use the pooled 
running variable and include teachers surrounding both the 200 and 425 thresholds. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** 
(p < 0.001) 
  
  
 
114 
Table 28: Effects of Crossing 275 and 300 Thresholds. DV= 1st Observation Score 
 
 
DV=1st TEAM Score if Num Obs > 1 
 
w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Crossing Prior 275 LOE 
Threshold 0.04 0.05 0.05* 
 [0.032] [0.026] [0.023] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 9529 14227 18570 
Crossing Prior 350 LOE 
Threshold -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.023] [0.018] [0.016] 
N (Tch-Yrs) 15211 22982 30528 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors in brackets. All models include previously discussed controls. The 
predictor of interest is crossing the 275 or 350 thresholds. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001) 
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D. Discontinuities Surrounding LOE Multiples of Five 
 
 
LOE-cont is the running variable is the RDD. If manipulation of the running variable is 
present, this threatens internal validity. However, standard tests for manipulation may falsely 
suggest manipulation of LOE-cont is present. 
Conventional tests of manipulation compare the probability density function (PDF) of the 
running variable as it approaches a cut score from the left to the PDF of the running variable as it 
approaches the cut score from the right. A relatively large difference between these PDF 
estimates is evidence of manipulation. However, this type of discontinuity in LOE-cont is 
expected since it is approximately continuous, invalidating conventional tests.  
LOE-cont scores are a weighted average determined by three components, and two 
components (achievement and growth scores) are integer variables in [1, 5]. Five is the least 
common multiple of weights applied to these two integer variables, so all linear combinations of 
these two components are multiples of five. Any LOE deviating from a multiple of five only 
does so due to summative observational ratings since this LOE component is composed of 
rational numbers. Thus, the distribution of summative observational ratings entirely determines 
the continuity of LOE scores. Moreover, it seems like there should be a preponderance of LOE 
scores at multiples of five.  
Figure 2 is a histogram of continuous LOE. Figure 3 is the distribution of these same 
scores transformed via modulus five (LOEmod5). All LOE multiples of 5 are transformed to 0 in 
LOEmod5. Figure 3 shows concentrations of the PDF at multiples of five, as expected. 
Considering approximately continuous properties of LOE-cont, I remove the two integer 
components from LOE-cont before testing for manipulation.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of Lagged Continuous LOE 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Lagged Continuous LOE 
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E. Tennessee Educator Survey Items 
 
 
 
Operationalized 
Variables 
Survey Items Scales Years 
Administered 
Operationalizations 
Sum: Svy PD 
Hours (pdhrs) 
Content: In-depth study of topics in my 
subjects 
None; 1-5 
Hours; 6-20 
Hours; 21-40 
Hours; More 
than 40 Hours 
2013, 2014, 
2015 
Converted to hours by 
assigning each response 
to the lower bound of 
each item response 
interval (e.g. the 
response "1-5" assigned 
to 1, response "More 
than 40" assigned to 40). 
Add together all 
responses across these 
items within a year to 
produce a PD hours sum. 
Preparing students to take the TCAP 
Preparing students to take the CRA 
and/or writing assessments (2014, 2015 
only) 
Analyzing and interpreting student 
assessment results 
Classroom organization 
Teaching special student populations 
(e.g., English language learners and 
students) 
Student behavior management  
Addressing students’ socio-emotional 
development and/or student behavior 
Reviewing standards and curriculum to 
determine learning outcomes for my 
students 
Pedagogy: Strategies for teaching my 
subject(s) 
  
 
119 
Sum: Svy Tch 
Collab 
(tchcollab) 
Met with other teachers to discuss 
standards, instruction, and/or student 
learning 
Never; About 
once a 
semester; 
About once a 
month; Two or 
three times a 
month; About 
once a week; 
More than 
once a week 
2015 Responses converted 
into collaborative 
meetings per year. Never 
= 0, semesterly = 2, 
monthly = 7, two or 
three times monthly = 
14, weekly = 28, more 
than weekly = 56. Add 
all responses across 
items within a year to 
produce a sum. 
Met with the whole faculty at my school 
Worked with other teachers to develop 
materials or activities for particular 
classes 
Observed another teacher’s classroom  
Reviewed student assessment data with 
other teachers to make 
instructional decisions 
Sum: Svy 
Exerted More 
Effort (effortsum) 
Focusing on the content covered by 
TCAP  
Less time and 
effort than last 
year; The same 
time and effort 
as last year; 
More time and 
effort than last 
year; Not 
applicable 
2013, 2014 Assigned "Less time" 
and "The same time" to 
0, "More time" to 1. Add 
together all responses 
across these items within 
a year to produce a sum. 
Engaging in other self-selected 
professional development opportunities 
to improve my content knowledge and/or 
teaching skills  
Reflecting on and discussing teaching 
and learning with my inquiry team or 
other teachers, coaches, etc.  
Tutoring individuals or small groups of 
students outside of class time  
Engaging in informal self-directed 
learning (e.g., reading a mathematics 
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education journal, using the Internet to 
enrich knowledge and skills)  
Re-teaching topics or skills based on 
students’ performance on classroom tests 
Assigning or reassigning students to 
groups within my class  
Preparing lessons 
Differentiating instruction to address 
individual student needs  
Communicating with parents orally or in 
writing  
Attending district- or school-sponsored 
workshops  
Integrating material from multiple 
subjects into lessons I teach (e.g., 
incorporating mathematics content into 
science or social studies classes)  
Completing tasks required for teaching 
observations and evaluation activities 
Disciplining students 
Svy Hrs 
Improved 
Instruction 
(insthrs) 
Approximately how much time have you 
invested so far during the 2013-2014 
school year in efforts to improve your 
instructional practices?  
1-10 hours; 11-
20 hours; 21-
40 hours; 41-
60 hours; 61-
2014 Converted to hours by 
assigning each response 
to the lower bound of 
each response interval 
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80 hours; 81-
100 hours; 
More than 100 
hours 
(e.g. the response "1-10" 
assigned to 1, response 
"More than 100" 
assigned to 100) 
Sum: Svy Hrs 
Prepped for Obs 
(obshrs) 
How much TOTAL TIME have you 
spent on the following activities related 
to observations of your teaching during 
this school year?  
None; Less 
than 1 hour; 1 
to 2 hours; 2 to 
3 hours; 3 to 5 
hours; Over 5 
hours 
2013, 2014 Converted to hours by 
assigning each response 
to the lower bound of 
each response interval 
(e.g. the response "Less 
than 1 hour" assigned to 
0.5, response "1 to 2" 
assigned to 1, "Over 5 
hours" assigned to 5) 
Evaluations Will 
Improve 
Teaching 
(imprvtch) 
In general, the teacher evaluation 
process used in my school has led to 
improvements in my teaching. (2015 
only) 
Strongly 
Disagree; 
Disagree; 
Agree: 
Strongly Agree 
2013, 2014, 
2015 
Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree assigned to 0; 
Agree, Strongly Agree 
assigned to 1. 
The teacher evaluation process used in 
my school will improve my teaching. 
(2013, 2014 only) 
Post-Observation 
Feedback is 
Useful (fbuseful) 
School leadership provides useful 
feedback about my instructional 
practices. (2015 only) 
Strongly 
Disagree; 
2014, 2015 For the 2014 responses, 
if a teacher Agreed or 
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Respondents were first asked if they 
were observed by any of the following: 
Principal, Assistant/ Vice Principal, 
Department Head, Senior Teacher/ 
Mentor/ Lead Teacher, Instructional 
Coach, Observer not working at their 
school, Other. For each role group 
selected, respondents were then provided 
this item: "This observer provided useful 
feedback about my teaching." (2014 
only) 
Disagree; 
Agree; 
Strongly Agree 
Strongly Agreed that any 
one of the role groups 
provided useful feedback 
the variable was coded 
as 1, the variable was 
coded as 0 if the teacher 
selected only Disagree or 
Strongly Disagree. For 
the 2015 responses 
Strongly Disagree and 
Disagree were assigned 
to 0, Agree and Strongly 
Agree assigned to 1. 
Changed 
Teaching due to 
Evaluations 
(chngtch) 
I made changes to my teaching based on 
my evaluation results 
Strongly 
Disagree; 
Disagree; 
Agree: 
Strongly Agree 
2014 Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree assigned to 0; 
Agree, Strongly Agree 
assigned to 1. 
Observers are 
Qualified 
(obsqual) 
My observers are qualified to evaluate 
my teaching 
2013, 2014 
Evaluations are 
Fair (faireval) 
The processes used to conduct my 
teacher evaluation are fair to me 
2013, 2014 
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F. Sensitivity of Instrument Validity to Treatment of Survey Measures 
 
 
 I used measures based on survey items to check for the presence of two threats to the 
internal validity of my instruments: an impetus to improve and psychological boost. I concluded 
the instruments are not threatened by either psychological effect. However, findings in Tables 8 
– 10 may be sensitive to my treatment of survey items. In this section I explore the sensitivity of 
findings from the impetus to improve and psychological boost tests to different treatments of 
survey items. These sensitivity tests yield qualitatively similar results to those discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Sensitivity of Tests to an Impetus to Improve 
The original tests for an impetus to improve used five different measures based on survey 
items: hours spent in PD (PDhrs), frequency of teacher collaboration (tchcollab), hours spent 
improving instruction (insthrs), hours spent preparing for observations (obshrs), and effort 
invested in different activities (effortsum). The first four measures are based on survey items 
asking teachers about the amount of time spent on various activities. Each response to the 
original survey items28 is an interval/ frequency. For example, in response to items contributing 
to PDhrs teachers could choose: None, 1-5 Hours, 6-20 Hours, etc. The original 
operationalization of these items converted these ordinal responses onto a continuous scale by 
assigning each response the lower boundary of the chosen interval/ frequency. Thus, if a teacher 
chose the “1-5 Hours” response this was converted to a value of one. The converted responses of 
items associated with PDhrs and tchcollab were then collapsed into single measures by adding 
                                               
28 Despite the ordinal scale of these outcomes there is no evidence supporting the parallel regressions assumption.  
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all responses together, respectively. The insthrs and obshrs were each measured by a single item. 
Responses to original effortsum items were not intervals/ frequencies. These responses asked if a 
teacher exerted less, the same, or more effort on a particular activity. I originally operationalized 
the lowest and middle categories to zero, and highest category to one, before collapsing all 
effortsum responses into a sum.  
In this section I check the sensitivity of tests regarding an impetus to improve to different 
operationalizations of individual survey items and collapsing functions. A new version of PDhrs, 
tchcollab, insthrs, and obshrs items assigns original responses to the higher boundary of the 
chosen interval/ frequency. I refer to this as the MAX conversion. A new version of effortsum 
items assigns the middle category to one instead of zero, which I refer to as the HI conversion. I 
also collapse multiple items measuring the same impetus to improve by taking means and sums. 
These new operationalizations yield eleven new impetus to improve items: PDhrsMAX, 
PDhrsmn, PDhrsMAXmn, tchcollabMAX, tchcollabmn, tchcollabMAXmn, effortsumHI, effortmn, 
effortHImn, insthrsMAX, and obshrsMAX. All MAX (HI) measures are based on the MAX (HI) 
conversion and mn items are based on means instead of sums. Collapsed measures without “mn” 
in the label are based on sums.  
 Results from these sensitivity tests are in Tables 29 and 30. Results in Table 29 are based 
on the pooled sample and use all four instruments whereas findings in Table 30 only use 425-
threshold samples and instruments. Results in both tables are qualitatively similar to those in 
Tables 8 and 9. Moreover, relationships between individual instruments and impetus to improve 
measures resemble those discussed in Chapter 4. In a bandwidth of 20 the 200-Apprentice and 
200-Professional instruments positively predict all versions of tchcollab. The 200-Apprentice 
instrument negatively predicts all versions of effortsum in a bandwidth of 20. The 200-
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Professional and 425-Professional instruments positively predict obshrsMAX. And again, the 
425-threshold instruments are unrelated to impetus to improve measures in the 425-threshold 
sample (see Table 30).  
   
Sensitivity of Tests to a Psychological Boost 
 In Chapter 4 I tested for the presence of a threatening psychological performance boost 
using survey items I characterized as measuring “reinforcing perceptions.” I argued that if 
evaluation scores (i.e. LOE) produced by the teacher evaluation system improved teacher 
performance via a psychological boost, psychologically boosted teachers should hold more 
positive views of the evaluation system. There was no evidence of such reinforcing perceptions. 
In this section I test the sensitivity of those findings to my treatment of the survey items. 
 Original tests for reinforcing perceptions used five survey items, each measuring teacher 
perceptions about the legitimacy or usefulness of the evaluation system. None of these items 
were collapsed into single measures, unlike some of the impetus to improve measures. Each 
version of PDhrs, tchcollab, and effortsum were based on multiple items administered as a 
cluster of items on the same survey (see Appendix E). Items measuring reinforcing perceptions 
were not administered as a cluster nor were all these items administered on the same survey (see 
Appendix E). In this section I collapse all reinforcing perceptions items into a sum of all binary 
responses. This new operationalization only uses responses from the 2014 TES because that was 
the only year all reinforcing perception items were included on the same survey. Table 31 shows 
results from this new operationalization. Again, there is no evidence of reinforcing perceptions.  
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Table 29: Alternative Operationalizations of Impetus to Improve Survey Outcomes 
  
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Sum: MAX Hrs in 
PD (PDhrsMAX) 
0.85 1.00 1.20 
[0.494] [0.406] [0.310] 
Mean: Hrs in PD 
(PDhrsmn) 
1.43 1.31 1.28 
[0.223] [0.265] [0.274] 
Mean: MAX Hrs 
in PD 
(PDhrsMAXmn) 
0.67 0.76 0.93 
[0.609] [0.554] [0.445] 
Sum: MAX Svy 
Tch Collab 
(tchcollabMAX) 
5.63*** 1.11 1.74 
[< 0.001] [0.348] [0.138] 
Mean: Svy Tch 
Collab 
(tchcollabmn) 
5.58*** 1.02 1.79 
[< 0.001] [0.395] [0.129] 
Mean: MAX Svy 
Tch Collab 
(tchcollabMAXmn) 
5.44*** 1.01 1.68 
[< 0.001] [0.400] [0.151] 
Sum: HI Svy 
Exerted More 
Effort 
(effortsumHI) 
3.57** 1.87 0.59 
[0.007] [0.112] [0.671] 
Mean: Svy 
Exerted More 
Effort (effortmn) 
4.13** 1.69 0.60 
[0.003] [0.150] [0.661] 
Mean: HI Svy 
Exerted More 
Effort 
(effortHImn) 
4.13** 1.69 0.60 
[0.003] [0.150] [0.661] 
Sum: MAX Svy 
Hrs Improved 
Instruction 
(insthrsMAX) 
0.14 0.34 0.41 
[0.967] [0.852] [0.803] 
Sum: MAX Svy 
Hrs Prepped for 
Obs (obshrsMAX) 
0.68 2.54* 2.09 
[0.606] [0.038] [0.079] 
Note: p-values in brackets, number of teacher-year records in sample in parentheses. All models include teacher 
demographics, certification status, controls for the distribution of teacher effectiveness at the school level, a 
second order polynomial of LOE interacted with teacher certification status, and year fixed effects. Samples sizes 
are the same as corresponding samples in Table 8. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)   
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Table 30: Alternative Operationalizations of Impetus to Improve Outcomes: 425-Threshold  
 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Sum: MAX Hrs in 
PD (PDhrsMAX) 
0.37 1.11 0.56 
[0.693] [0.329] [0.572] 
Mean: Hrs in PD 
(PDhrsmn) 
0.15 0.95 0.45 
[0.860] [0.385] [0.638] 
Mean: MAX Hrs 
in PD 
(PDhrsMAXmn) 
0.46 0.95 0.31 
[0.629] [0.386] [0.732] 
Sum: MAX Svy 
Tch Collab 
(tchcollabMAX) 
1.58 0.89 0.94 
[0.208] [0.412] [0.392] 
Mean: Svy Tch 
Collab 
(tchcollabmn) 
1.61 0.81 1.27 
[0.201] [0.443] [0.280] 
Mean: MAX Svy 
Tch Collab 
(tchcollabMAXmn) 
1.61 0.85 1.04 
[0.201] [0.429] [0.352] 
Sum: HI Svy 
Exerted More 
Effort 
(effortsumHI) 
0.92 0.12 < 0.01 
[0.399] [0.886] [0.999] 
Mean: Svy 
Exerted More 
Effort (effortmn) 
0.81 0.05 < 0.01 
[0.444] [0.950] [0.996] 
Mean: HI Svy 
Exerted More 
Effort 
(effortHImn) 
0.81 0.05 < 0.01 
[0.444] [0.950] [0.996] 
Sum: MAX Svy 
Hrs Improved 
Instruction 
(insthrsMAX) 
0.06 0.15 0.40 
[0.937] [0.857] [0.670] 
Sum: MAX Svy 
Hrs Prepped for 
Obs (obshrsMAX) 
0.87 0.69 0.15 
[0.420] [0.500] [0.863] 
 
Note: Ibid.  
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Table 31: Alternative Operationalization of Reinforcing Perceptions Outcomes 
 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
Sum: Reinforcing 
Perceptions 
(reinforcesum)  
1.18 0.99 0.78 
[0.306] [0.372] [0.460] 
(2775) (4252) (5547) 
Note: p-values in brackets, number of teacher-year records in sample in parentheses. All models include teacher 
demographics, certification status, controls for the distribution of teacher effectiveness at the school level, and 
second order polynomial of LOE interacted with teacher certification status.  
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G. Non-linear Effects 
 
 
Models referenced in the text assume a linear relationship between observations received 
and teacher performance. However, this assumption is invalid if the effect of an additional 
observation depends on the number of observations received. For example, diminishing marginal 
effects are plausible. After receiving some number of observations per year, subsequent post-
observation feedback may overwhelm the teacher, stymieing productive responses. It may also 
be that feedback provided by observers becomes incoherent over time.  
I explore non-linear effects in two ways. In full-sample RDDs I modify the functional 
form of the instruments and endogenous predictors. This approach will not work in local RDDs 
since the instruments in these models are binary. To explore non-linearities in local RDDs I 
allow first- and second-stage estimates to vary with each threshold. There is little reason to 
believe non-linearities exist in any model. 
To estimate non-linearities in the full-sample RDDs I model non-linear forms of the 
instrument and endogenous predictor: this is the only difference between these new models and 
equations 9 and 10. In the first set of models estimating non-linear effects I model the instrument 
and endogenous predictors as second order polynomials29. The results of these models are 
graphed in Figures F1 – F3, which graph marginal effects. These figures suggest there is little, if 
any, curvature in these new relationships. Moreover, the difference in predicted outcomes from 
one observation to the next remains almost perfectly constant (see Figures 4 – 6). I also explore 
non-linearities by taking the natural log of the instrument and endogenous predictor. Figures 7 – 
9 graph the marginal effects of this non-linear modeling. Again, there is little reason to think the 
                                               
29 Third and fourth order polynomial versions could not estimate standard errors.  
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relationship between observations and teacher performance is non-linear in full-sample RDD 
models. 
 To estimate non-linearities in the relationship between observations and teacher 
performance using local RDDs I exploit the fact these models use two discontinuities. I create 
three endogenous predictors by interacting the number of observations received with a new 
three-category variable. I assign teachers with an LOE1 to one group, those with an LOE2 - 
LOE4 to a second, and LOE5 teachers to the final group. The policy-assigned number of 
observations in each category does not vary for teachers holding the same certification status. 
Replacing the single endogenous predictor in equation 2 with the interacted three endogenous 
predictors is the only difference between these new models and equations 1 and 2. Results from 
these new models are listed in Table 32.  
 There is no evidence the relationship between observations and the outcomes of interest 
varies by LOE. While point estimates differ based on LOE, these differences are not statistically 
different. For example, in a bandwidth of 20 the relationship between observations and changes 
in TLM RLA scores for teachers with a LOE1 and LOE5 are 0.08 and 0.23. But, the 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are approximately [-0.567, 0.732] and [-0.917, 1.222], 
which overlap with one another.  
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Figure 4: Quadratic IV and Endogenous Predictors 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Quadratic IV and Endogenous Predictors 
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Figure 6: Quadratic IV and Endogenous Predictors 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Natural Log of IV and Endogenous Predictors 
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Figure 8: Natural Log of IV and Endogenous Predictors 
 
 
Figure 9: Natural Log of IV and Endogenous Predictors 
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Table 32: Pooled Local RDD Estimated Non-Linear Relationships 
 
 DV=TVAAS DV=TLM Math DV=TLM RLA 
2nd Stage Non-
Linear 
Observations 
w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
 LOE1 -1.21 -1.86 -2.39 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.08 -0.06 -0.13 
 [2.558] [1.833] [1.517] [0.113] [0.089] [0.108] [0.331] [0.111] [0.119] 
 LOE2 – 4 1.27 -0.03 -0.91 0.04 0.03 -0.11 0.15 -0.08 -0.21 
 [4.248] [3.173] [2.570] [0.192] [0.154] [0.191] [0.546] [0.193] [0.210] 
 LOE5 2.14 0.21 -1.25 0.12 0.09 -0.12 0.23 -0.11 -0.29 
 [6.040] [4.567] [3.777] [0.268] [0.217] [0.277] [0.760] [0.280] [0.302] 
N(Tch-Yrs) 10014 152507 20731 3348 5205 7197 3143 4906 6783 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors in brackets. Estimated relationships are main effects, not interactions. Effects separated by teacher LOE, which are the 
same LOE used in the discontinuous policy assignment of observations. Models include previously discussed controls.  
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H. Heterogeneous Effects by Teacher and School Characteristics 
 
 
 There is no evidence an additional observation improves teacher performance. However, 
heterogeneous effects may exist. I interact potential moderators with the instrumental and 
endogenous variables in the local RDD described by equations 1 and 2 to test for heterogeneous 
effects.  
 
Operationalization of Moderators 
 I explored heterogeneous effects with respect to teacher years of experience by 
categorizing the continuous years of experience variable. I assigned teachers with [0, 5), [5, 10), 
and [10, 70) years of experience to three different categories, then replaced the continuous years 
of experience control with the categorical experience variable. I discuss estimates produced by 
this moderation analysis elsewhere (see Table 19).  
 Prior research implied teacher perceptions about the usefulness/ credibility of the 
observation or evaluation system may moderate the effectiveness of observations. I conducted 
moderation analyses using survey measures of these teacher perceptions. The Tennessee 
Educator Survey (TES) asked teachers to report whether they dis/ agreed with the following 
statements: evaluations will improve teaching (imprvtch); evaluations are conducted fairly 
(faireval); my observer is qualified (obsqual); and, post-observation feedback is useful (fbuseful) 
(see Appendix E). I used these four measures to create school level moderators. I first 
dichotomized each of the four survey measures, then calculated the proportion of survey 
respondents in a school-year cell reporting that they agreed with each statement, yielding four 
school-year variables. Then, I rank ordered schools within each study year and identified the 
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quartiles of these distributions. This produced four time-variant, school level moderators, with 
each variable having four categories. Importantly, the survey items underlying these four school 
level moderators were measured near the end of the academic year during which teachers 
received their observations. For this reason, I assume teachers with good observation-related 
experiences will report higher opinions of the observation and evaluation system. If observations 
have a positive impact on performance for any of these teacher subgroups, research reviewed in 
Chapter 2 suggests it would be the subgroup of teachers reporting that those observations were 
useful/ acceptable.  
 The last set of moderators concern observer effectiveness. I estimate LATEs moderated 
by school-year level administrator: skills as a teacher evaluator, skills as a supporter of teacher 
professional learning, and general effectiveness as measured by the summative administrator 
TEAM (admTEAM) score and LOE (admLOE). TDOE administrative data include each of these 
measures. I constructed the other two observer effectiveness moderators.  
 Over the study period, the administrator TEAM rubric underwent multiple revisions. 
However, each version of the rubric included indicators describing administrator behaviors 
related to their skills as a teacher evaluator and supporter of teacher professional learning. After 
reviewing administrator rubric used during the study period, I identified indicators describing 
behaviors related to teacher evaluation and professional learning. Table 33 presents these 
indicators, the domains they belonged to, and years during which they were on the rubric. I find 
the mean score across administrator TEAM indicators measuring their skill as a teacher evaluator 
(indicators QTE1 – QTE5 and PLG1, see Table 33). This becomes the admTE moderator (see the 
Heterogeneous Effects by Teacher and School Characteristics section in Chapter 5). I created the 
admPL moderator (see Chapter 5) by taking the mean score of items related to the 
  
 
137 
administrator’s skill as a supporter of teacher professional learning (CI1, ILCI1, PLG2 and PLG3 
in Table 33). There is one caveat to the operationalization of the four observer effectiveness 
moderators: not all observers receive administrator TEAM or LOE scores because not all 
observers are administrators. School administrators conducted over 80% of observations during 
the study period. Some observers are district employees or teachers themselves.  
 
Findings 
 I discuss most moderation analyses in Chapter 5 (see Tables 18 – 21). Findings discussed 
here pertain to moderators concerning teacher perceptions. Table 34 displays results from 
moderation by evalfair (top panel) and imprvtch (bottom), and Table 35 includes results from 
moderation by obsqual (top panel) and fbuseful (bottom panel). Similar to results in Tables 18 – 
21, almost all point estimates in Tables 34 and 35 are negative or statistically insignificant. 
However, almost none of the results exhibit hypothesized patterns across subgroups. The only 
findings providing very weak support for the hypothesized heterogeneous patterns are effects on 
TVAAS moderated by perceptions about the usefulness of feedback (fbuseful). Point estimates 
increase as the proportion survey respondents in a school report finding feedback useful. Yet, 
none of these are statistically distinguishable from one another.  
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Table 33: Selected Administrator TEAM Rubric Indicators 
Academic Years TEAM Domains TEAM Indicators 
Skill as a Teacher Evaluator 
2012-13,  
2013-14 
Quality of Teacher 
Evaluation 
QTE1 - Accurately calibrates evidence to the 
rubric 
QTE2 - Effectively communicates the 
importance, intent and process of evaluation to 
educators 
QTE3 - Provides accurate, high quality 
feedback to teachers and about instructional 
practices 
QTE4 - Uses data to reflect on evaluation 
trends 
QTE5 - Performs the process of teacher 
evaluation with fidelity 
2014-15 Professional Learning and Growth PLG1 - Evaluation 
Skill as a Supporter of Teacher Professional Learning 
2012-13,  
2013-14 Continuous Improvement CI1 - Professional Learning Support 
2014-15 
Instructional Leadership for 
Continuous Improvement ILCI1 - Capacity Building 
Professional Learning and 
Growth 
PLG2 - Differentiated Professional Learning 
PLG3 - Induction, Support, Retention, and 
Growth 
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Table 34: Heterogenous Effects by Perceptions About Evaluation System 
 
 TVAAS TLM Math TLM RLA 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
 School-Level Proportion of TES Respondents Agreeing Evals Are Fair 
1st Qrt 1.58 0.82 1.10 -0.15 -0.08 -0.09 -0.13 -0.08 -0.08 
 [-4.35,7.51] [-2.54,4.19] [-2.36,4.56] [-0.30,0.01] [-0.20,0.04] [-0.20,0.02] [-0.31,0.05] [-0.21,0.05] [-0.20,0.04] 
2nd Qrt 2.20 0.43 0.25 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.07 -0.09* 
 [-2.68,7.07] [-2.59,3.44] [-2.88,3.38] [-0.13,0.24] [-0.15,0.19] [-0.14,0.16] [-0.24,0.04] [-0.19,0.06] [-0.19,-0.00] 
3rd Qrt 2.68 1.46 1.32 > -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.19* -0.13 -0.11 
 [-3.10,8.45] [-2.24,5.17] [-2.35,5.00] [-0.17,0.17] [-0.19,0.15] [-0.11,0.17] [-0.37,-0.01] [-0.32,0.06] [-0.26,0.04] 
4th Qrt 2.72 0.26 0.88 0.03 -0.02 < 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
 [-3.77,9.22] [-2.94,3.47] [-2.28,4.04] [-0.18,0.24] [-0.17,0.13] [-0.13,0.13] [-0.31,0.27] [-0.21,0.14] [-0.16,0.09] 
 1382 2136 3013 637 998 1373 569 890 1228 
 School-Level Proportion of TES Respondents Agreeing Evals Will Improve Teaching 
1st Qrt -1.53 -0.92 -0.92 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 
 [-3.37,0.31] [-2.20,0.35] [-2.22,0.37] [-0.19,0.03] [-0.16,0.04] [-0.13,0.05] [-0.13,0.07] [-0.12,0.04] [-0.13,0.02] 
2nd Qrt -1.28 -1.67* -1.58* -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.15* 
 [-3.09,0.53] [-3.07,-0.27] [-2.87,-0.28] [-0.14,0.12] [-0.14,0.09] [-0.09,0.12] [-0.25,0.05] [-0.23,0.00] [-0.26,-0.03] 
3rd Qrt -0.69 -0.61 -0.33 -0.03 -0.03 < 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 
 [-2.56,1.19] [-2.11,0.90] [-1.70,1.04] [-0.19,0.12] [-0.16,0.11] [-0.12,0.12] [-0.09,0.11] [-0.10,0.05] [-0.14,0.02] 
4th Qrt -0.32 -0.33 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12* 
 [-2.91,2.25] [-1.97,1.31] [-1.51,1.35] [-0.20,0.08] [-0.15,0.09] [-0.09,0.12] [-0.16,0.05] [-0.19,0.00] [-0.22,-0.02] 
 2297 3621 5151 1041 1658 2320 1002 1594 2208 
Note: Teacher-clustered standard errors in brackets. Models include previously discussed controls. * (p < 0.05), ** (p < 0.01), *** (p < 0.001)  
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Table 35: Heterogenous Effects by Perceptions About Observation System 
 
 TVAAS TLM Math TLM RLA 
 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 w = 20 w = 30 w = 40 
 School-Level Proportion of TES Respondents Agreeing Observers Qualified 
1st Qrt -0.73 -0.81 -0.73 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 
 [-4.82,3.36] [-3.01,1.40] [-2.83,1.37] [-0.16,0.05] [-0.12,0.09] [-0.11,0.08] [-0.28,0.15] [-0.21,0.12] [-0.17,0.10] 
2nd Qrt 0.24 -0.06 -0.71 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
 [-4.77,5.25] [-2.80,2.68] [-3.35,1.93] [-0.11,0.12] [-0.10,0.17] [-0.09,0.15] [-0.17,0.20] [-0.22,0.14] [-0.17,0.10] 
3rd Qrt 0.31 0.45 0.17 -0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12** 
 [-2.79,3.39] [-1.65,2.55] [-1.74,2.07] [-0.19,0.17] [-0.10,0.23] [-0.09,0.18] [-0.20,0.04] [-0.20,0.05] [-0.22,-0.03] 
4th Qrt 0.45 0.07 0.52 -0.14 -0.08 -0.02 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 
 [-6.46,7.36] [-3.43,3.57] [-2.42,3.45] [-0.45,0.17] [-0.31,0.14] [-0.20,0.16] [-0.42,0.09] [-0.40,0.07] [-0.36,0.01] 
 1397 2154 3036 643 1010 1387 564 881 1223 
 School-Level Proportion of TES Respondents Agreeing Feedback is Useful 
1st Qrt -1.11 -1.21 -1.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 
 [-2.97,0.76] [-2.75,0.33] [-2.46,0.43] [-0.19,0.11] [-0.15,0.10] [-0.13,0.09] [-0.18,0.07] [-0.20,0.02] [-0.21,0.02] 
2nd Qrt > -0.01 -0.68 -0.61 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 [-1.90,1.89] [-2.23,0.88] [-2.05,0.83] [-0.12,0.14] [-0.16,0.08] [-0.12,0.10] [-0.10,0.16] [-0.12,0.08] [-0.14,0.09] 
3rd Qrt -0.41 -0.47 -0.48 -0.16 -0.14* -0.10 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 
 [-2.22,1.40] [-2.07,1.12] [-1.99,1.03] [-0.33,0.00] [-0.28,-0.01] [-0.22,0.03] [-0.18,0.12] [-0.22,0.03] [-0.19,0.04] 
4th Qrt 0.17 -0.19 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.11* 
 [-1.52,1.85] [-1.56,1.17] [-1.36,1.24] [-0.20,0.08] [-0.16,0.07] [-0.12,0.09] [-0.16,0.11] [-0.21,0.02] [-0.22,-0.00] 
 1585 2533 3664 704 1140 1626 680 1117 1576 
Note: Ibid  
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